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INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
Joel Jay Finer
At a time when public defenders' offices are overburdened with
heavy caseloads, and members of the bar, including many with neither
expertise nor experience in criminal litigation, are increasingly being
appointed to try criminal cases, the claim that defense counsel has
rendered ineffective assistance is being received somewhat more
sympathetically than it has been in the past.' Unfortunately, the
standards of legal competence enunciated by appellate courts pro-
vide little guidance for trial or habeas courts to follow. As a result,
numerous decisions of trial courts rejecting ineffective assistance claims
have been reversed on appeal. The law on ineffective assistance merits
review, with emphasis upon what measures may be taken to assure
more effective assistance than is typically being rendered, and with the
objective of providing clearer standards for the courts to follow. 2
t Professor of Law, University of Arizona. B.B.A. 1959, City College of New York;
LL.B., M.A. 1963, Yale University.
1 One commentator persuasively demonstrates that Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45
(1932), guarantees not merely a timely and operative appointment of counsel, but also,
in light of subsequent cases, a right to the assistance of counsel whose quality of per-
formance does not fall below a certain level. See Waltz, Inadequacy of Trial Defense
Representation as a Ground for Post-Conviction Relief in Criminal Cases, 59 Nw. U.L.
REv. 289, 293-95 (1964). See also White v. Ragen, 324 U.S. 760 (1945); Glasser v. United
States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942); Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444 (1940).
The courts are divided on the question of whether there is a constitutional right to
defend oneself without counsel. See United States v. Plattner, 330 F.2d 271, 274 (2d Cir.
1964) (leading case for proposition that there is an "absolute and primary right to con-
duct one's own defense in propria persona'). Compare Lowe v. United States, 418 F.2d
100, 103 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1048 (1970); United States v. Sternman, 415
F.2d 1165, 1169-70 (6th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 907 (1970); Arnold v. United States,
414 F.2d 1056, 1058 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1021 (1970), with Van Nattan v.
United States, 357 F.2d 161, 163-64 (10th Cir. 1966); and Brown v. United States, 264 F.2d
363, 365 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 911 (1959). In a recent, well-reasoned opinion,
the Supreme Court of California held that "there is no express federal constitutional
compulsion to afford an accused the right of self-representation in criminal trials." People
v. Sharp, 7 Cal. 3d 448, 457, 499 P.2d 489, 494, 103 Cal. Rptr. 233, 238 (1972).





Historically, for assistance to be ineffective, counsel's efforts must
have been so perfunctory as to render the trial a farce, a mockery of
justice. 3 On its face, this standard puts an unduly heavy burden on the
defendant. It deprives him of a reasonable opportunity of being ac-
quitted whenever trial counsel's errors, although serious and preju-
dicial, were not so blatant as to render the trial a farce. Moreover, the
farce or mockery standard is unduly vague and is therefore unpredict-
able and difficult to apply.
Some courts have purported to reject the farce or mockery stan-
dard.4 One court has stated that the appropriate question is whether
"gross incompetence blotted out the essence of a substantial defense." 5
This test, however, provides no guidance for a determination of what
constitutes "gross incompetence"; it only suggests a finding of preju-
dice once gross incompetence is established. Another court posed the
standard as "whether under all the circumstances of the particular
case the [defendant] was afforded genuine and effective representa-
tion."6 Such a test, however, begs the question by incorporating the
term to be defined. Moreover, "genuine" means authentic, honest, sin-
cere, real, or "free from hypocrisy or pretense,"' a definition which is of
no aid in determining counsel's adequacy. It has been noted in sev-
eral cases "[t]hat 'effective' counsel required by due process . . . is not
errorless counsel; rather, it is counsel 'reasonably likely to render, and
rendering reasonably effective assistance.' " This formulation likewise
begs the question.
also Grano, The Right to Counsel: Collateral Issues Affecting Due Process, 54 MINN. L.
REv. 1175, 1239-63 (1970); Note, Effective Assistance of Counsel for the Indigent Defendant,
78 HARV. L. REV. 1434 (1965); Note, Effective Assistance of Counsel, 49 VA. L. REv. 1531
(1963).
8 See, e.g., Bell v. Alabama, 367 F.2d 243 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 916
(1967); Nutt v. United States, 335 F.2d 817 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 909 (1964);
United States ex rel. Cooper v. Reincke, 333 F.2d 608 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 909
(1964); Frand v. United States, 801 F.2d 102 (10th Cir. 1962); Cofield v. United States, 263
F.2d 686 (9th Cir.), rev'd per curiam, 360 U.S. 472 (1959); Mitchell v. United States, 259
F.2d 787 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 850 (1958); Diggs v. Welch, 148 F.2d 667 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 889 (1945).
4 See, e.g., Scott v. United States, 427 F.2d 609 (D.C. Cir. 1970); State v. Merchant, 10
Md. App. 545, 271 A.2d 752 (1970).
5 Scott v. United States, 427 F.2d 609, 610 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
6 State v. Merchant, 10 Md. App. 545, 550, 271 A.2d 752, 755 (1970).
7 WEBSTER'S UNABRIDGED INTERNATIONAL DICrIONARY 1047 (2d ed. 1955).
8 In re Saunders, 2 Cal. 3d 1033, 1041, 472 P.2d 921, 926, 88 Cal. Rptr. 633, 638 (1970)
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Other tests have been suggested which are akin to malpractice
standards: for example, whether counsel's performance was at the level
"of normal competency,"9 or whether it was "equal to the exercise of
normal customary skill and knowledge."' 0 It has been said that the at-
torney should "perform at least as well as any attorney with ordinary
training in the legal profession, and... exercise the usual amount of
skill and judgment exhibited by an attorney conscientiously seeking
to protect his client's interests."" These tests do provide a standard
capable of application by a court, since a court can evaluate a par-
ticular attorney's practice in light of the normal and customary skill
exhibited in the courtroom. This malpractice test, with some modi-
fications to be suggested below, is the most workable and satisfactory
standard.
Another test, closely related to the test of normal customary skill,
holds counsel's assistance ineffective if no reasonable attorney would
have so acted.' 2 This test properly gives great leeway to trial counsel,
since many acts and omissions might be argued about by reasonably
skilled lawyers. If conscientious lawyers might differ as to the pro-
priety of the act or omission, it may properly be said that the defen-
dant has not received ineffective assistance.'3 In applying these tests,
courts customarily look to counsel's behavior to determine whether it
can be justified by tactical considerations. If there is any reasonable
tactical or strategic basis for counsel's conduct, it is not considered in-
effective.' 4
A variation of the malpractice standard should be adopted. The
formulation of this standard should recognize that lawyers' talents are
not fungible. A perfectly competent corporate lawyer may be in-
competent in criminal defense work because his training, skills, ex-
perience, and interests are not in the criminal process. Merely grad-
uating from law school (where the attorney may have taken only the
(en banc), quoting MacKenna v. Ellis, 280 F.2d 592, 599 (5th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 368
U.S. 877 (1961) (emphasis in original).
9 Moore v. United States, 432 F.2d 730, 737 (3d Cir. 1970).
10 State v. Anderson, 117 N.J. Super. 507, 519, 287 A.2d 234, 240 (App. Div. 1971).
11 Kott v. Green, 303 F. Supp. 821, 822 (N.D. Ohio 1968).
12 State v. White, 5 Wash. App. 283, 487 P.2d 243 (1971), rev'd, 81 Wash. 2d 223, 500
P.2d 1242 (1972).
13 See United States v. Garguilo, 324 F.2d 795 (2d Cir. 1963).
14 See Williams v. Beto, 354 F.2d 698 (5th Cir. 1965); In re Ernst, 294 F.2d 556 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 943 (1961); Snider v. Cunningham, 292 F.2d 683 (4th Cir.
1961); Bolden v. United States, 266 F.2d 460 (D.C. Cir. 1959); Harris v. United States, 239
F.2d 612 (5th Cir. 1957); State v. Fulford, 290 Minn. 236, 187 N.W.2d 270 (1971); notes
97 & 117-36 and accompanying text infra.
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minimum required courses in criminal law and evidence), passing a bar
examination (which typically devotes only a small fraction of questions
to criminal law and evidence), and drafting corporate bylaws or filing
registration statements with the SEC do not equip an attorney to handle
a criminal defense. A criminal defendant is entitled to better assistance
than such a corporate attorney could provide. The test of effective
assistance of counsel should be whether counsel exhibited the normal
and customary degree of skill possessed by attorneys who are fairly
skilled in the criminal law and who have a fair amount of experience
at the criminal bar. In applying this standard to particular actions or
omissions of counsel, the relevant question should be whether coun-
sel's behavior was such that reasonably competent and fairly experi-
enced criminal defense lawyers might debate its propriety. If such a
debate may exist, assistance should not be found ineffective.
A defendant should not be exposed to any significant risk that
his counsel's incompetence contributed to his conviction. A defendant
is not entitled to perfect counsel, to error-free representation, or to a
defense of which no lawyer would doubt the wisdom. Lawyers make
mistakes; the practice of law is not a science, and it is easy to second
guess lawyers' decisions with the benefit of hindsight. Many criminal
defendants in the boredom of prison life have little difficulty in recall-
ing particular actions or omissions of their trial counsel that might
have been less advantageous than an alternate course. As a general
rule, the relative wisdom or lack thereof of counsel's decisions should
not be open for review after conviction. Only when defense counsel's
conduct cannot be explained by any tactical or strategic justification
which at least some reasonably competent, fairly experienced criminal
defense lawyers might agree with or find reasonably debatable, should
counsel's performance be considered inadequate. Such a finding of in-
effective representation should reverse a defendant's conviction if coun-
sel's conduct created a reasonable possibility of contributing to that
conviction.
It may be argued that a liberal policy of reversal on ineffective
assistance grounds will encourage counsel with weak cases to deliber-
ately blunder in order to invalidate the conviction or cause a mistrial.15
But this argument ignores the devastating effect that a finding of in-
effective assistance can have on an attorney's reputation. As the Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has observed:
15 See Norman v. United States, 100 F.2d 905, 906-07 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 806 U.S.
660 (1939). See also Waltz, supra note 1, at 318.
1080 [Vol. 58:1077
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Attorneys generally are greatly concerned with their profes-
sional reputations. They know that to lose a good reputation for
faithful adherence to the cause of the client is not only to lose
that which they should most highly treasure but is to lose their
practice as well.16
Moreover, counsel who are flagrant in their incompetent representa-
tion can and should be formally reprimanded or censored by the bar.
In addition, trial counsel is usually cognizant of the fact that in the
majority of cases, if the defendant is to prevail, he has a far better
chance of doing so at the trial rather than at the appellate level. Coun-
sel is not likely to forfeit his chance of success at the trial in the hope
of obtaining a reversal on appeal based on ineffective assistance grounds.
Even if unethical counsel deliberately "throws" a trial, the result
should not be an affirmance of the conviction; the defendant, at least
when not a party to counsel's deliberate misfeasance, should be en-
titled to a new trial in which he is represented by diligent and con-
scientious counsel.
II
CIRCUMSTANCES CONSTITUTING INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE
A. Advising the Defendant To Enter a Guilty Plea
Traditionally, an accused is entitled to the assistance of counsel
in deciding whether to plead guilty.'2 Occasionally, counsel assures his
client that he will receive a more lenient sentence than he actually
does receive. For example, counsel may promise his client that a guilty
plea will result in probation or a nonjail sentence. If upon pleading
guilty the client is sentenced to imprisonment, it has been held that
the defendant was denied effective assistance.18 Some courts have set
aside convictions pursuant to guilty pleas when counsel made promises
that went unfulfilled, without indicating whether the ground was in-
effective assistance or the absence of a voluntary plea. 9
On the other hand, it has been said that "[a] mere disappointed
16 Williams v. Beto, 354 F.2d 698, 706 (5th Cir. 1965).
17 See, e.g., Williams v. Kaiser, 323 U.S. 471 (1945).
18 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Thurmond v, Mancusi, 275 F. Supp. 508 (E.D.N.Y.
1967); State v. Tunender, 182 Neb. 701, 157 N.W.2d 165 (1968).
19 See, e.g., United States v. Shneer, 105 F. Supp. 883 (E.D. Pa. 1951), aff'd, 194 F.2d
598 (3d Cir. 1952); People v. Walker, 250 I1. 427, 95 N.E. 475 (1911). See also State v.
Casaras, 104 Mont. 404, 66 P.2d 774 (1937) (guilty plea based on counsel's promise of no
death sentence set aside as involuntary).
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expectation of great leniency does not vitiate a plea."20 Cases have held
that a defendant was not denied effective assistance and was not en-
titled to withdraw his guilty plea when his attorney had told him that
a light sentence had been arranged,21 assured him of a suspended sen-
tence,22 or told him that the prosecutor agreed that on a plea of guilty
the defendant would be permitted to join the armed forces.2 3 In each
of these situations, the sentence was harsher than the attorney had
promised.
When an attorney assures a defendant of a particularly lenient
disposition and such assurance is not justified, it would appear that the
attorney has prevented his client from making an informed and intel-
ligent appraisal of the consequences of a guilty plea. The Supreme
Court, in Kercheval v. United States,24 noted that for a guilty plea to
be valid it must be "made voluntarily after proper advice and with
full understanding of the consequences. '2 i Thus, another ground for
vacating a guilty plea is counsel's erroneous advice to the defendant of
the statutory maximum for an offense. 28 Similarly, if counsel errone-
ously advises the defendant of the absence of a particular collateral
consequence of a guilty plea and the defendant pleads guilty primarily
because of that advice, it cannot be said that the plea was intelligently
made.2 7 A guilty plea will also be set aside if defense counsel connives
with the prosecution to induce the plea by false promises.2 8 If, how-
20 Monroe v. Huff, 145 F.2d 249 (D.C. Cir. 1944).
21 See Thomson v. Huff, 149 F.2d 842 (D.C. Cir. 1945); United States ex rel. Wilkins
v. Banmiller, 205 F. Supp. 123 (E.D. Pa. 1962), aff'd, 325 F.2d 514 (3d Cir. 1963), cert.
denied, 379 U.S. 847 (1964).
22 See United States v. Weese, 145 F.2d 135 (2d Cir. 1944).
23 See Dorsey v. Gill, 148 F.2d 857 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 890 (1945).
24 274 U.S. 220 (1927).
25 Id. at 223.
26 See, e.g., Mathis v. North Carolina, 266 F. Supp. 841 (M.D.N.C. 1967).
27 United States v. Parrino, 212 F.2d 919, 922 (2d Cir. 1954) (Frank, J., dissenting)
(defendant advised that guilty plea would prevent his deportation).
28 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Wissenfeld v. Wilkens, 281 F.2d 707 (2d Cir. 1960).
Indeed, under the Supreme Court's recent ruling in Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257
(1971), a prosecutor's unfulfilled promise to recommend a light sentence or not to make
any recommendation at all is grounds either for setting aside a guilty plea or for allowing
the defendant to plead before another judge, whatever may have been defense counsel's
role in knowingly bringing about the misguided guilty plea. In Santobello, where the
prosecutor recommended a maximum sentence in breach of his predecessor's promise not
to recommend any sentence, and the trial judge imposed the maximum sentence, the Court
remanded the case to the state court for a determination of whether the defendant should
be resentenced by a different judge or should be allowed to replead to the original charges.
The Court stated: "[W]hen a plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or agree-
ment of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the inducement or considera-
tion, such promise must be fulfilled." Id. at 262.
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ever, the attorney simply indicates to a client his well-considered opin-
ion that a lenient sentence is probable but not certain, then the client
takes a calculated risk in pleading guilty and cannot subsequently com-
plain because his hope was not realized.29
Once defense counsel has made a definite promise of leniency to
a defendant, even a trial judge's compliance with Rule 11 of the Fed-
eral Rules of Criminal Procedure 0 or with the plea-taking require-
ments set forth in Boykin v. Alabama,31 should not be sufficient to
negate the ineffective assistance claim. The defendant who is deter-
mined to plead guilty can, in most cases, be expected to treat the court's
inquiry into the voluntariness of his plea as a ritual he must go through
in order to register his guilty plea and to receive the lenient sentence
promised by counsel, and will perfunctorily answer "no" if asked
whether any promises have been made. 2
Even prior to Santobello some courts had held that any unfulfilled promise
of the prosecutor was grounds for withdrawal of a guilty plea. See, e.g., People v.
Cassidy, 90 Ili. App. 2d 132, 232 N.E.2d 795 (1967) (defendant promised probation
and fine but received prison term); State v. Wolske, 280 Minn. 465, 160 N.W.2d 146
(1968) (unkept promise to dismiss court charges); State v. Krois, 74 Wash. 2d 404, 445
P.2d 24 (1968) (unkept promise of hospital care). In Hilliard v. Beto, 465 F.2d 829 (5th Cir.
1972), the court held that a state prisoner's habeas corpus petition should be granted if
he could establish, as alleged, that the prosecution had promised to recommend five years'
imprisonment and then stood silently as the judge imposed a life sentence. Going further
than the courts in these cases, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has held that
even when the prosecutor fulfills his promise to recommend a light sentence, but the trial
judge does not accept the recommendation and, in fact, imposes a more severe sentence,
Santobello requires that the defendant be given an opportunity to withdraw his plea. See
Culbreath v. Rundle, 466 F.2d 730 (3d Cir. 1972); cf. United States v. Lester, 247 F.2d 496
(2d Cir. 1957); United States v. Paglia, 190 F.2d 445 (2d Cir. 1951).
29 For example, in Davidson v. State, 92 Idaho 104, 105, 437 P.2d 620, 621 (1968), the
court held that a "mere prediction by counsel of the court's likely attitude on a sentence,
short of some implication of an agreement or understanding.., is not ground for attack-
ing a guilty plea."
80 The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, and shall not accept such plea
or a plea of nolo contendere without first addressing the defendant personally and
determining that the plea is made voluntarily with understanding of the nature
and the consequences of the plea.
FED. R. Cmi. P. 11.
31 395 U.S. 238, 24243 (1969).
32 It has been held that the defendant's denial at a guilty plea hearing that the
prosecution has made a promise is not enough to validate a guilty plea when a prosecu-
torial promise has in fact gone unfulfilled. See Walters v. Harris, 460 F.2d 988 (4th Cir.
1972). The court in Walters observed: "Examination of the defendant alone will not always
bring out into the open a promise that has induced his guilty plea." Id. at 993. The court
noted that disclaimers are often mere ritual generated "out of fear that a truthful re-
sponse would jeopardize the bargain." Id. The court implied that its observation applied
equally to promises made by defense counsel. Id. One blatant example of the guilty plea
ritual occurred in United States ex rel. McGrath v. La Vallee, 319 F.2d 308 (2d Cir. 1963).
In La Vallee the judge told the defendant in chambers what answers to give in the sub-
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Guilty pleas have also been set aside when counsel was not aware
of the law creating a defense,33 when counsel did not adequately in-
vestigate the facts relating to a possible defense,3 4 when counsel failed
to raise certain defenses, 35 and when counsel did not advise the defen-
dant of the right to challenge the composition of the grand jury.36
To assure that the defendant has been properly advised by coun-
sel, the trial judge, before accepting a guilty plea, should make an inquiry
of counsel as to what he told the defendant about the penalty to be im-
posed, the nature of the charge, the consequences of the guilty plea,
and other relevant matters. If the trial judge in the course of this in-
quiry discovers that counsel misled the defendant or did not fully ex-
plain the nature of the charge and the consequences of the plea, counsel
ought to be required to fully inform the defendant before the judge
makes his Rule 11 or Boykin inquiries.
The consequences that should follow from counsel's failure to ex-
plain to a defendant his legal rights are well expressed in the dissenting
opinion in Mitz v. State:37
I do not think it matters in the least whether an explanation
of all his legal rights would have helped him, nor whether we are
able to discover that it would or would not have done so. The
only question for us to determine is: Were these rights explained
to him? If they were not explained to him he has not had due
process. Appellant had no burden to show that the explanation
of these rights would have helped him, nor that the failure to
make such explanation could have harmed him. 3
sequent proceeding for the taking of a guilty plea. See generally Committee on Rules of
Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States, Proposed Amend-
ments to Criminal Rule 11, 52 F.R.D. 409, 426 (1971).
83 See In re Williams, 1 Cal. 3d 168, 460 P.2d 984, 81 Cal. Rptr. 784 (1969); notes
39-47 and accompanying text infra.
34 See McLaughlin v. Royster, 346 F. Supp. 297 (E.D. Va. 1972); People v. Bennett,
29 N.Y.2d 462, 280 N.E.2d 637, 329 N.Y.S.2d 801 (1972); notes 48-65 and accompanying
text infra.
35 See Smalwood v. Warden, 205 F. Supp. 325 (D. Md. 1962); State v. Merchant, 10
Md. App. 545, 271 A.2d 752 (1970).
386 See Colson v. Smith, 315 F. Supp. 179 (N.D. Ga. 1970), aff'd, 438 F.2d 1075 (5th Cir.
1971).
87 233 Ind. 537, 121 NXE.2d 874 (1954).
38 Id. at 544-45, 121 N.E.2d at 877 (dissenting opinion). A further illustration of the
consequences of failing to inform the defendant of his legal rights is found in Abraham
v. State, 228 Ind. 179, 91 N.E2d 358 (1950). There, the court set aside a guilty plea be-
cause of ineffective assistance when the defendant was neither asked to relate his version
of the alleged offense nor requested to indicate which witnessses had relevant information.
Furthermore, the accused was never advised by counsel of his right to a jury trial, the
nature of the charges against him, or his right to require the state to prove him guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt.
1084 [Vol. 58:1077
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B. Counsel's Ignorance of the Law
When counsel had an erroneous notion of the law and conse-
quently did not raise a defense, move to suppress evidence, or call par-
ticular witnesses, some courts have found that ineffective assistance has
been rendered. 9 In People v. Ibarra,40 counsel did not challenge the
legality of a search which produced heroin because he was unaware
of the rule of law that allowed him to do so. The California Supreme
Court found that counsel's "decision reflected, not judgment, but un-
awareness of a rule of law basic to the case; a rule that reasonable
preparation would have revealed. '41 In a case before the California
District Court of Appeal, counsel had failed to object to illegally seized
evidence because he misread the leading case involving the relevance
of a parole officer's presence to the legality of a search.4 The court
stated somewhat sarcastically that counsel "should have put the onus
of an adverse ruling on the trial judge rather than himself." 43
When counsel had advised a plea of guilty to the charge of forgery,
unaware that under the controlling law the defendant could only be
prosecuted under a statute proscribing misuse of credit cards (which
carried a lesser penalty than forgery), the California Supreme Court
found that counsel had proceeded "'in default of knowledge that rea-
sonable inquiry would have produced, and hence in default of any
judgment at all.' " The lack of reasonable inquiry was illustrated in
another case in which the conviction of a defendant was reversed when
counsel erroneously agreed with the trial judge that the law denied the
court power to grant probation.45 Some courts have also pointed to
errors of law or failure to research the law as factors contributing to a
finding of ineffective assistance.46
The opinions finding ineffective assistance of counsel under the
89 See, e.g., People v. McDowell, 69 Cal. 2d 737, 447 P.2d 97, 73 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1968);
People v. Wellborn, 257 Cal. App. 2d 513, 65 Cal. Rptr. 8 (1967); cf. notes 40-45 infra.
40 60 Cal. 2d 460, 386 P.2d 487, 34 Cal. Rptr. 863 (1963).
41 Id. at 466, 386 P.2d at 491, 34 Cal. Rptr. at 867.
42 People v. Coffman, 2 Cal. App. 3d 681, 82 Cal. Rptr. 782 (1969).
43 Id. at 691, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 788.
44 In re Williams, 1 Cal. 3d 168, 177, 460 P.2d 984, 990, 81 Cal. Rptr. 784, 790 (1969),
quoting Brubaker v. Dickson, 310 F.2d 30, 39 (9th Cir. 1962). For a holding finding in-
excusable the failure of counsel to raise an almost identical point of law, see In re Green-
field, 11 Cal. App. 3d 536, 89 Cal. Rptr. 847 (1970).
45 See Wilson v. Reagan, 354 F.2d 45 (9th Cir. 1965).
46 In Brubaker v. Dickson, 310 F.2d 30 (9th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 978
(1963), counsel did not arrange for a psychiatrist to examine his client because he mis-
takenly believed that the communications would not be privileged. In Kott v. Green, 303
F. Supp. 821 (N.D. Ohio 1968), counsel did not research the law bearing on the admis-
sibility of prior convictions or on the claim of larceny and its possible defenses.
1973] 1085
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circumstances enumerated above are logical; counsel should at least
be expected to know or take reasonable steps to discover the law rele-
vant to his client's defense. When counsel proceeds from ignorance or
mistake of the law and his action or inaction can reasonably be assumed
to have contributed to his client's conviction, the defendant has been
prejudiced by counsel's incompetence and the conviction should be set
aside47
C. Failure of Counsel To Investigate the Facts
There are a number of decisions in which the failure of counsel
to make a factual investigation of matters relating to the alleged crime,
to a defense, to suppressibility of evidence, or to other matters impor-
tant to the defense has been held to constitute ineffective assistance.
For example, when counsel did not raise the diminished responsibility
defense, a court rejected the argument that counsel's inaction was based
on tactical reasons, because counsel had made no serious efforts to ob-
tain available medical reports reflecting past diagnoses and treatment
and had made no attempt to have the defendant examined by a psy-
chiatrist.48
Failure to investigate the facts relating to an insanity defense has
been held to constitute ineffective assistance.49 In Brooks v. Texas,0
investigation would have uncovered the defendant's prior commitments
to at least three different mental institutions and his two attempts at sui-
cide. Counsel did not have the defendant examined by a psychiatrist
and did not- study the report of the psychiatrist appointed by the
prosecuting attorney who had examined the defendant. The court
concluded that the trial was no more than a "mockery of justice.","
In other cases courts have held that counsel's failure to investigate
the circumstances under which the defendant's confession was obtained
amounted to ineffective assistance. 2 In one such case, the defendant
did not tell his attorney of his confession and the circumstances under
which it was given. The court, in finding counsel's assistance inadequate,
47 This test of prejudice will be explored in notes 170-71 and accompanying text infra.
48 See In re Saunders, 2 Cal. 3d 1033, 472 P.2d 921, 88 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1970) (en banc).
49 See, e.g., Brooks v. Texas, 381 F.2d 619 (5th Cir. 1967); McLaughlin v. Royster, 346
F. Supp. 297 (E.D. Va. 1972); Goodwin v. Swenson, 287 F. Supp. 166 (W.D. Mo. 1968);
People v. Bennett, 29 N.Y.2d 462, 280 N.E.2d 637, 329 N.Y.S.2d 801 (1972).
50 381 F.2d 619 (5th Cir. 1967).
51 Id. at 625.
52 See, e.g., Jones v. Cunningham, 297 F.2d 851 (4th Cir. 1962); Kott v. Green, 303 F.
Supp. 821 (N.D. Ohio 1968); Bentley v. Florida, 285 F. Supp. 494 (SD. Fla. 1968); Smother-




observed that the "lawyer who does not probe, does not inquire, and
does not seek out all the facts relevant to his client's cause is prepared
to do little more than stand still at the time of trial."53
Counsel's failure to investigate the circumstances of an arrest and
search 4 or the circumstances of pretrial identification of the defen-
dant55 has been considered ineffective assistance. When counsel kept
the defendant from testifying on the belief that he had a prior felony
conviction, and proper investigation would have revealed no such con-
viction, ineffective assistance was found,5 6 as it has been when counsel
made no inquiry of the defendant's version of the facts. 57
Several cases have involved multiple failings of trial counsel. In
State v. Anderson,58 counsel neglected to examine the prosecution file,
failed to seek out the FBI reports, which included a comparison of the
defendant's handwriting with that of the demand note used in the
robbery of which defendant was accused, failed to interview the accom-
plice who had testified against the defendant in order to develop the
bias and prejudice of the accomplice, failed to examine the grand jury
minutes, and failed to obtain the photographs that were shown to the
victim. The court held that counsel's performance amounted to no
preparation for trial.59
Some courts have presumed prejudice to the defendant and have
reversed convictions when counsel conducted no investigation and the
prosecution cannot affirmatively show lack of prejudice to the accused. 60
The defendant is entitled to have counsel make a reasonably thorough
investigation of facts relating to the charges and any possible defenses.61
53 Smotherman v. Beto, 276 F. Supp. 579, 588 (NMD. Tex. 1967). See generally Kott v.
Green, 303 F. Supp. 821 (NMD. Ohio 1968). In Kott the court said counsel should have done
more than merely rely on the defendant's statement; he should have independently in-
vestigated the facts. Id. at 823.
54 See United States ex rel. Kimbrough v. Rundle, 293 F. Supp. 839 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
55 See Moore v. United States, 432 F.2d 730 (3d Cir. 1970).
56 See People v. Shells, 4 Cal. 3d 626, 483 P.2d 1227, 94 Cal. Rptr. 275 (1971).
57 See Turner v. Maryland, 303 F.2d 507 (4th Cir. 1962); Abraham v. State, 228 Ind.
179, 91 N.E.2d 358 (1950).
58 117 NJ. Super. 507, 285 A.2d 234 (App. Div. 1971).
59 Id. at 521, 285 A.2d at 241.
60 See, e.g., Coles v. Peyton, 389 F.2d 224 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 849 (1968);
Bentley v. Florida, 285 F. Supp. 494 (SMD. Fla. 1968).
61 An American Bar Association Project has suggested that defense attorneys have
the responsibility
to conduct a prompt investigation of the circumstances of the case and explore
all avenues leading to facts relevant to guilt and degree of guilt or penalty. The
investigation should always include efforts to secure information in the possession
of the prosecution and law enforcement authorities. The duty to investigate exists
regardless of the accused's admissions or statements to the lawyer of facts con-
stituting guilt or his stated desire to plead guilty.
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If counsel does not make such investigation but allows his client to
plead guilty or goes to trial with insufficient preparation, the convic-
tion should be set aside on a minimal showing of prejudice. The stan-
dard of prejudice set forth in McLaughlin v. Royster,62 is appropriate:
"'[The] possibility that investigation by counsel might well have un-
earthed favorable evidence ... standing alone, is a sufficient showing
of prejudice. '63 The test should be whether an adequate factual in-
vestigation would have enabled counsel to cast reasonable doubt on
the government's evidence or to create a defense sufficient to go to a
jury.
In order to assure that counsel renders competent assistance, the
court, before accepting a guilty plea, should inquire of counsel, outside
the presence of the prosecution, what he told the defendant about the
nature of the charges, the consequences of conviction, the right to a
jury trial, the government's burden of proof, and other rights that fol-
low from a plea of not guilty. Counsel's inquiries to the defendant and
his responses, the consideration and rejection of possible defenses, and
the extent of counsel's preparation or investigation of the pertinent law
and facts before advice was given on the defendant's plea are also proper
subjects for this examination. In Abraham v. State,64 such an inquiry
by the court would have revealed ineffective assistance before the guilty
plea was accepted. There, the court observed:
Neither counsel made any attempt to determine how the confes-
sion had been obtained, or whether it would be admissible upon
trial. Appellants were not advised as to their rights to have a jury
trial, nor were they advised that the charge of inflicting an injury
during the robbery included the offenses of robbery, grand larceny
and petit larceny. They were not told they had the right to require
the state to prove them guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of some
offense charged before they could be convicted. They were not
asked to relate their version of the alleged offense, nor was any
effort made to ascertain what witnesses would know about the
alleged offense, nor was any investigation made as to what their
testimony would be. 5
ABA PRoJECr ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO THE PROSECU-
TION FUNCTION AND ThE DEFENSE FUNCTION § 4.1 (Approved Draft 1970). See also id. § 4.1,
at 226-28 (commentary).
62 846 F. Supp. 297 (E.D. Va. 1972).
63 Id. at 300. In Williams v. Beto, 354 F.2d 698 (5th Cir. 1965), the court found no
prejudice in counsel's failure to interview witnesses when the defendant did not show that
they would have been helpful.
64 228 Ind. 179, 91 N.E.2d 858 (1950).
65 Id. at 183-84, 91 N.E2d at 860 (citation omitted).
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D. Insufficient Time To Prepare for Trial Because of Late Appoint-
ment or Short Consultation with the Client
When counsel has been appointed a very short time before trial
or has consulted with his client only briefly, some courts have found
ineffective assistance, without indicating in what way the defendant
had been prejudiced.6 6 Thus, a one-minute consultation has been held
to be ineffective assistance,67 as has a five-minute consultation, 8 an hour
consultation,69 and other short consultations or tardy appointments
prior to trial or to a guilty plea.70
Some courts have sustained the ineffective assistance claim on the
basis that the attorney could have done more had he had more time! 1
For example, failure to have witnesses ready for trial 2 (including locat-
ing or subpoenaing alibi witnesses73), to investigate an insanity de-
fense,74 to consider whether to make a pretrial motion to suppress
seized evidence and a confession,75 to study the law and facts relating
to penetration in a rape case,76 and to show that stains on a defendant's
shirt were brake fluid and not semen 77 have constituted abuses amount-
ing to inadequate representation. In finding four hours preparation
time to be insufficient, one court mentioned the following functions
that counsel was required to perform: (1) looking up the statute and
66 The opinion of the Supreme Court in Hawk v. Olsen, 326 U.S. 271 (1945), can be
read as implying that an ineffective assistance claim would be sustained without a showing
of prejudice when counsel did not confer with his client at all. But see Chambers v.
Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
67 United States v. Helwig, 159 F.2d 616 (3d Cir. 1947).
68 Turner v. Maryland, 303 F.2d 507 (4th Cir. 1962); Bentley v. Florida, 285 F. Supp.
494 (S.D. Fla. 1968).
19 Kott v. Green, 303 F. Supp. 821 (N.D. Ohio 1968).
70 Calloway v. Powell, 393 F.2d 886 (5th Cir. 1968); United States v. Vasilick, 206 F.
Supp. 195 (M.D. Pa. 1962); cf. Townsend v. Bomar, 351 F.2d 499 (6th Cir. 1965).
71 See, e.g., White v. Ragen, 324 U.S. 760 (1945); Brooks v. Texas, 381 F.2d 619 (5th
Cir. 1967); Roberts v. Dutton, 368 F.2d 465 (5th Cir. 1966); McLaughlin v. Royster, 346 F.
Supp. 297 (E.D. Va. 1972); United States ex rel. Williams v. Brierley, 291 F. Supp. 912
(E.D. Pa. 1968); United States v. Yodock, 224 F. Supp. 887 (M.D. Pa. 1963); cf. MacKenna
v. Ellis, 280 F.2d 592 (5th Cir. 1960), modified, 289 F.2d 928, cert. denied, 368 U.S. 877
(1961).
72 See White v. Ragen, 324 U.S. 760 (1945); MacKenna v. Ellis, 280 F.2d 592 (5th Cir.
1960), modified, 289 F.2d 928, cert. denied, 368 U.S. 877 (1961).
73 See United States ex rel. Williams v. Brierley, 291 F. Supp. 912 (E.D. Pa. 1968);
United States v. Yodock, 224 F. Supp. 877 (M.D. Pa. 1963).
74 See Brooks v. Texas, 381 F.2d 619 (5th Cir. 1967); McLaughlin v. Royster, 346 F.
Supp. 297 (E.D. Va. 1972).
75 See United States ex rel. Williams v. Brierley, 291 F. Supp. 912 (E.D. Pa. 1968).




cases on the crime involved, (2) communicating to the defendant the
prospective testimony counsel had heard, (3) identifying leads which
might be helpful in impeachment, (4) ascertaining facts from the defen-
dant's point of view, (5) searching for alibi witnesses, (6) exploring the
circumstances under which a photograph was shown to prospective wit-
nesses, (7) compiling information on the client's mental capacity, and
(8) scrutinizing the list of jurors.78
Other courts have denied the ineffective assistance claim when no
prejudice resulted from a late appointment or short consultation.79 In
Avery v. Alabama,80 the Supreme Court rejected the claim that coun-
sel did not have sufficient time and opportunity to investigate and to
prepare a defense. The Court found that counsel's inquiries of the defen-
dant and material witnesses yielded nothing that would have helped the
defense. Even though counsel did not have an opportunity to confer
with doctors who might have known about the defendant's mental con-
dition and had not summoned medical experts, the Court concluded
that counsel had rendered effective assistance. The Court found com-
pelling the absence of any indication that counsel could have done
more had additional time been granted. 81
The Fourth Circuit has taken the position that when appointment
of counsel is so close to trial that there is very little time to prepare, prej-
udice will be presumed and the state will bear the burden of proving
lack of prejudice. 82 Although the court has stated that it will not re-
quire a showing of actual prejudice, in several cases in which it applied
the presumption the court indicated what more counsel could have
done. In Twiford v. Peyton,83 for example, the Fourth Circuit pointed
out that counsel might have taken advantage of facts of which he be-
latedly learned-the existence of an alibi witness and bias on the part
78 Rastrom v. Robbins, 440 F.2d 1251, 1255 (lst Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 863 (1971).
79 See, e.g., Callahan v. Russell, 423 F.2d 450 (6th Cir. 1970) (15-minute consultation
upheld, subject to showing of actual prejudice); Daugherty v. Beto, 388 F.2d 810 (5th Cir.
1967), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 986 (1968) (15-minute consultation alone does not establish
ineffective assistance); Baldwin v. United States, 260 F.2d 117 (4th Cir. 1958), cert. denied,
360 U.S. 938 (1959) (six hours from appointment to trial not prejudicial). See also Cham-
bers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970); United States ex rel. Spears v. Rundle, 268 F. Supp.
691 (E.D. Pa. 1967), aff'd, 405 F.2d 1037 (3d Cir. 1969).
80 308 U.S. 444 (1940).
81 Id. at 449-52. It has been suggested that it may be possible to prepare adequately
for some cases in as short a time as 15 minutes. See United States v. Wight, 176 F.2d 376,
378-79 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 950 (1950).
82 See Twiford v. Peyton, 372 F.2d 670 (4th Cir. 1967); Martin v. Commonwealth, 365
F.2d 549 (4th Cir. 1966).
83 372 F.2d 670 (4th Cir. 1967).
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of prosecution witnesses.84 In Martin v. Commonwealth, 5 the same
court indicated that if counsel had had more time he could have in-
quired into whether the attempted theft of an automobile should have
been treated as a misdemeanor and whether a motion for a change of
venue was appropriate in light of strong community feeling regarding
the case. In Fields v. Peyton,8s the defendant was convicted of burglary
and escape. The Fourth Circuit observed that with more time counsel
could have inquired into the meaning of the burglary statute under
which the defendant was charged and might have learned of factors sur-
rounding the escape that could have mitigated the severe sentence.
On the other hand, in Turner v. Maryland,8 7 the Fourth Circuit found
that although counsel's brief consultation with his client was deplor-
able, the absence of prejudice was evidenced by the fact that the ac-
cused had no information to convey to the lawyer that would have
been helpful to the defense.
Late appointment of counsel or a very short consultation between
counsel and client would seem to be equivalent to no representation
at all. In such a case, the defendant should have the burden only of
going forward-of showing possible lines of investigation or inquiry
that counsel with more time might have pursued. Once this minimal
burden has been met there should be a rebuttable presumption of
prejudice. This presumption could be rebutted by evidence showing
that even if counsel had had more time there would have been no
reasonable possibility of uncovering evidence sufficient to take a de-
84 Id. at 672-73. The Third Circuit, in United States ex rel. Mathis v. Rundle, 394
F.2d 748 (3d Cir. 1968), adopted the Fourth Circuit's rule when it approved the following
language in Twiford:
[W]e have implied that these deplorable practices [late appointment of counsel]
are inherently prejudicial, and a mere showing of them constitutes a prima facie
case of denial of effective assistance of counsel, so that the burden of proving lack
of prejudice is shifted to the state.
Id. at 752, quoting Twiford v. Peyton, 372 F.2d 670, 673 (4th Cir. 1967). In Moore v.
United States, 432 F.2d 730 (3d Cir. 1970), the court overruled Mathis, but replaced the
presumption of prejudice with a "strong inference of prejudice from the failure to appoint
counsel until the day of trial or very shortly prior thereto." Id. at 735.
The Sixth Circuit has implied that it will apply a presumption of prejudice when
counsel was appointed very shortly before trial. Thus, in United States v. Knight, 443 F.2d
174 (6th Cir. 1971), ineffective assistance was found when counsel had only 30 minutes to
prepare before trial and no opportunity to interview witnesses. The First Circuit has con-
sidered and rejected the Fourth Circuit's presumption approach to late appointment of
counsel. See Rastrom v. Robbins, 440 F.2d 1251 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 863 (1971).
85 365 F.2d 549 (4th Cir. 1966).
86 375 F.2d 624 (4th Cir. 1967).
87 318 F.2d 852 (4th Cir. 1963). ., .
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fense to the jury or to cast reasonable doubt on the government's
affirmative case. Counsel's failure to make an investigation or inquiry
that would have proved fruitless is not a dereliction that is detrimental
to the defendant.
In determining when a defendant should prevail under the prin-
ciples suggested above, the sufficiency of the time of appointment or of
the period of consultation should be judged on the basis of whether
counsel has had a reasonable opportunity to prepare the defense. A
prima facie case of ineffective assistance would be made out if the defen-
dant could show possible lines of investigation that his counsel might
have pursued and that counsel did not have enough time to
confer with his client without undue delay and as often as neces-
sary, to advise him of his rights and to elicit matters of defense or
to ascertain that potential defenses are unavailable. Counsel must
conduct appropriate investigations, both factual and legal, to de-
termine if matters of defense can be developed, and to allow him-
self enough time for reflection and preparation for trial.88
In the current movement to assure speedy trials,"" courts and legis-
latures should not lose sight of the need to afford counsel sufficient time
to prepare. The widespread practice of last-minute appointments,
combined with the heavy case loads of public defenders and other at-
torneys, makes the prima facie standard mandatory. Counsel should be
appointed well in advance of arraignment and trial,90 preferably at the
initial presentment after arrest, in order that he may make a reasonably
thorough investigation of the facts and the law relating to possible
defenses. For legislatures to enact per se rules, such as a rule providing
that an arraignment or trial should not take place unless counsel has
been appointed at least fifteen days prior thereto, would seem ap-
propriate. If the prescribed preparation time were insufficient in a
particular case, counsel would have a duty to move for a continuance
and the court would have a duty to grant it.
E. Specific Purported Derelictions of Counsel
When counsel has failed to take a specific action, as, for example,
failing to raise a particular defense, to call or examine witnesses, or to
88 Coles v. Peyton, 389 F.2d 224, 226 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 849 (1968) (foot-
note omitted).
89 See, e.g., 2D Cm. RuLEs REGARDING PRoMpr DISosITION OF CRnI. CASES; Note, Speedy
Trial Schemes and Criminal Justice Delay, 57 CoRr.LL L. REv. 794 (1972).
90 Presumably, counsel will be appointed at the preliminary hearing. See Coleman v.
Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970). But even if no preliminary hearing takes place, the court can
and should appoint counsel sufficiently in advance of arraignment or trial.
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object to incompetent evidence, courts must determine whether coun-
sel's inaction was justified by tactical or other considerations. Even if
counsel's dereliction cannot be justified, courts should not reverse a
conviction without proof of prejudice. Proof of prejudice arising from
specific derelictions of defense counsel is not often discussed by courts.
Nevertheless, several courts have held that in addition to a showing of
incompetence by trial counsel, the defendant, to prevail, must show
substantial prejudice which possibly affected the outcome of the trial.9 '
Such a test places minimal importance on the right to counsel. The
denial of that right is the denial of a basic constitutional guarantee:
"The right to have the assistance of counsel is too fundamental and
absolute to allow the courts to indulge in nice calculations as to the
amount of prejudice arising from its denial."92 In White v. Maryland,9
the defendant did not have counsel when he pleaded guilty when
arraigned at a preliminary hearing. The Supreme Court, in reversing
the conviction, stated: "[W]e do not stop to determine whether prejudice
resulted."'9 4 When the Supreme Court enunciated the harmless error
test in Fahy v. Connecticut 5 and Chapman v. California,8 it did not
suggest that some constitutional violations could go unchecked under less
stringent criteria. In both Fahy and Chapman the Court held that when
constitutional rights are violated at a criminal trial-for example, by
the introduction of illegally seized evidence or by improper prosecu-
torial comments to the jury on the defendant's failure to testify-the
conviction must be reversed unless there was no reasonable possibility
that the violation contributed to the conviction. The conviction must
fall unless it can be shown that the error was harmless beyond a reason-
able doubt.
1. Failure To Make an Opening Statement
Failure to make an opening statement to the jury has been gen-
erally held not to amount to ineffective assistance,9 7 although one court
has mentioned it as a factor supporting a determination of ineffective
assistance.98 The absence of an opening statement can usually be justi-
91 See, e.g., People v. Johnson, 45 Ill. 2d 501, 259 N.E2.d 796 (1970).
92 Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 76 (1942).
93 373 U.S. 59 (1963).
94 Id. at 60; see Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961).
95 375 U.S. 85 (1963).
96 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
97 See, e.g., Williams v. Beto, 354 F.2d 698 (5th Cir. 1965); Tahl v. O'Connor, 336 F.
Supp. 576 (S.D. Cal. 1971), aff'd, 460 F.2d 1068 (9th Cir. 1972).
98 United States v. Hammonds, 425 F.2d 597 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
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fled by a tactical decision not to reveal a weak hand to the court or jury
at the outset,99 to wait and see what the government's case will be, or
not to commit the defendant prematurely to any particular line of
defense.100 Moreover, it is difficult to imagine a case in which the ab-
sence of an opening statement could be deemed prejudicial to the
defendant, even applying the constitutional harmless error test.
2. Failure To Challenge Admissibility of Seized Evidence or of a
Confession
Several courts have found ineffective assistance when counsel failed
to challenge the validity of a confession1 01 or of a search. 102 In Brubaker
v. Dickson,10 3 the prisoner's habeas corpus petition made out a prima
facie case for exclusion of the defendant's confession. The court, in
finding ineffective assistance, rejected counsel's argument that a stipula-
tion of admissibility of the confession, which was the sole evidence of
the defendant's guilt, was entered into on the theory that it would be
sound strategy to invoke the sympathy of the jury by a display of candor.
The court emphasized that the objection to the confession could have
been submitted outside the presence of the jury.104
In Commonwealth v. Maroney,10 5 ineffective assistance was found
in part because counsel failed to object to the introduction of the
defendant's confession. The court found the most obvious explanation
to be insufficient preparation. Counsel was unaware of any basis on
which to make a coercion claim until his client conveyed the informa-
tion in his testimony. The court found no sufficient legal or tactical
basis to support counsel's failure to object.10 In Pe6ple v. Ibarra,107
the court faulted counsel for failure to object to seized evidence and
observed that counsel's dereliction precluded resolution of the crucial
factual issues supporting the defendant's primary defense. In People v.
09 See, e.g., Tahl v. O'Connor, 336 F. Supp. 576, 582 (S.D. Cal. 1971).
100 See C. TEssMER, CRimiNAL TRAL STRATEGY 70 (1968).
101 See, e.g., Brubaker v. Dickson, 310 F.2d 30 (9th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S.
978 (1963); United States ex rel. Williams v. Brierley, 291 F. Supp. 912 (E.D. Pa. 1968);
Smotherman v. Beto, 276 F. Supp. 579 (N.D. Tex. 1967); Commonwealth v. Maroney, 427
Pa. 599, 235 A.2d 349 (1967).
102 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Williams v. Brierley, 291 F. Supp. 912 (E.D. Pa.
1968); People v. Ibarra, 60 Cal. 2d 460, 386 P.2d 487, 34 Cal. Rptr. 863 (1963); People v.
Coffman, 2 Cal. App. 3d 688, 82 Cal. Rptr. 782 (1969).
103 310 F.2d 30 (9th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 978 (1963).
104 310 F.2d at 38 n.46.
105 427 Pa. 599, 235 A.2d 349 (1967).
106 Id. at 611, 235 A.2d at 356.
107 60 Cal. 2d 460, 466, 386 P.2d 487, 491, 34 Cal. Rptr. 863, 867 (1963).
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Coffman,08 counsel did not object to the illegally seized evidence be-
cause he misread the leading case. The California District Court of
Appeal, in finding ineffective assistance, concluded that without the
illegal evidence conviction was reasonably probable; with it, conviction
was a virtual certainty.
On the other hand, the Ninth Circuit, in rejecting an ineffective
assistance claim when counsel failed to object to the introduction of
seized evidence, stated:
Why appellant's counsel failed to move to suppress the evidence,
or to object to the testimony, is not discernible from the record.
It may have been for any one of several reasons including trial
tactics or courtroom strategy since the sole defense offered at the
trial was that appellant was completely unaware of the presence
of the narcotics in the automobile. We decline to indulge in spec-
ulation in an effort to make plain that which is not discernible
in the record.109
The Ninth Circuit's opinion may be misguided. If counsel had a
valid basis for objecting to the admission of seized evidence, yet failed to
object, and this evidence influenced the judgment of conviction, the
ineffective assistance claim should have been upheld in the absence of
reasonably persuasive tactical justifications for counsel's omission.10
The reason given by the court-that the sole defense was that the
defendant was unaware of the presence of narcotics-does not in any
way tend to explain or to justify counsel's failure to object to the admis-
sion of the evidence.
In United States ex rel. Chambers v. Maroney,"' despite counsel's
late appointment, unfamiliarity with all aspects of the case before trial,
and ignorance of the manner in which evidence was obtained, the
Third Circuit held that failure to file a suppression motion as to items
taken from the defendant's car was not prejudicial since the motion would
108 2 Cal. App. 3d 688, 690, 82 Cal. Rptr. 782, 787-88 (1970).
109 Barba-Reyes v. United States, 387 F.2d 91, 93 (9th Cir. 1967). One case upheld a
conviction on a plea of guilty even though the defendant subsequently claimed that his
counsel did not advise him of the illegality of the arrest, search, seizure, and confession.
See Edwards v. United States, 256 F.2d 707 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 847 (1958).
Judge Bazelon, dissenting, said that if counsel advised a guilty plea despite knowledge of the
circumstances of the confession, then the client was deprived of effective assistance. 256
F.2d at 711.
110 For example, one justification found by a court for counsel's failure to challenge
the admissibility of evidence seized under an invalid warrant was that the search was
probably valid as incident to an arrest. See People v. Washington, 41 IMI. 2d 16, 21, 241
N.E.2d 425, 428 (1968).
111 408 F.2d 1186 (3d Cir. 1969), aff'd, 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
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undoubtedly have been decided against the defendant. The court stated
that even if the search warrant was invalid, the introduction of the
items seized from the defendant's home was harmless error.112
On review, the Supreme Court concurred in the reasoning of the
court of appeals on the ineffective assistance issue." 3 Justice Harlan,
dissenting, pointed out that the record suggested that counsel had vir-
tually no acquaintance with the facts of the case. He agreed "that the
strength of the search and seizure claims is an element to be considered
in the assessment of whether counsel was adequately prepared to make
an effective defense," but he could not "agree that the relevance of
those claims in this regard disappears upon a conclusion by an appellate
court that they do not invalidate the conviction." '
If Justice Harlan was saying that an ineffective assistance claim
based on the failure to make suppression motions should succeed even
if after the fact it is determined that those motions would have failed,
or that the introduction of the evidence was harmless error, he is not
persuasive. There is no point in having a new trial when one suppres-
sion motion would be properly rejected, or even if the suppression
motion should have been granted, when there is every probability that
the defendant would be convicted again." 5 If, on the other hand,
counsel did not investigate the facts relevant to a suppression motion
and the habeas court finds that there is a reasonable possibility that
investigation would have turned up facts which, as a matter of law,
would have supported such a motion, or counsel failed to make a sup-
pression motion because of ignorance of the law, the ineffective as-
sistance claim should be sustained as long as the introduction of the
evidence was not harmless error.
3. Failure To Cross-Examine Adverse Witnesses
Failure to cross-examine one or more adverse witnesses has gen-
erally been held not to constitute ineffective assistance." 6 In Frand v.
United States,1 7 the Tenth Circuit found that although counsel had
failed to cross-examine one witness and had only briefly cross-examined
112 408 F.2d at 1193-94.
13 399 U.S. at 53-54.
114 Id. at 59 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
115 There is language in Justice Harlan's opinion which suggests a reasonable ground
for reversal-when counsel's inexcusable failure to make suppression motions casts sub-
stantial doubt on whether, under the circumstances, defense counsel actually had sufficient
time to prepare his case. See id. at 59-60.
116 See, e.g., Frand v. United States, 301 F.2d 102 (10th Cir. 1962); Mitchell v. United
States, 259 F.2d 787 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 850 (1958).
117 301 F.2d 102 (10th Cir. 1962).
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the other witnesses it did not appear that more extensive cross-examina-
tion would have proved helpful or advantageous. Moreover, although
the cases do not mention this, there may be tactical reasons for de-
clining to cross-examine an adverse witness. Gross-examination may
have no reasonable prospect of weakening the witnesses' testimony or
credibility and may have the potentially undesirable effect of reinforc-
ing and emphasizing the harmful testimony.118
It has also been held that when counsel failed to impeach ac-
complices' testimony by drawing attention to their prior criminal
records in a trial before a judge, "counsel could have permissibly con-
cluded as a trial tactic and in light of trial realities that any attack
upon credibility would have [had] little impact."119 On the other hand,
an early opinion suggested that counsel was ineffective by virtue of
his inability to lay the foundation for impeaching the victim's parents
by proving that they had first charged assault and had later changed
the accusation to taking indecent liberties.120
The District of Columbia Circuit Court has found the failure to
cross-examine to be one of numerous derelictions of counsel which
in their totality justify reversal on grounds of ineffective assistance.121
The Third Circuit has indicated that defense counsel's failure on
cross-examination to go into the circumstances of pretrial confronta-
tions between the identification witness and the suspect may amount
to ineffective assistance. 122 The court rejected the government's con-
tention that counsel's failure to examine the confrontations was a
tactical decision made out of fear of exposing another charge against
the defendant. The record, however, indicated that counsel was pre-
pared to risk disclosure of the other accusation against the defendant.
123
118 See C. TESSMER, supra note 100, at 95.
119 Commonwealth v. Maroney, 427 Pa. 599, 610, 235 A.2d 349, 355 (1967). In Com-
monwealth ex rel. Sprangel v. Maroney, 423 Pa. 589, 225 A.2d 236 (1967), the court gave
a very dubious rationale for counsel's failure to impeach the most important prosecution
witness by proof of previous convictions for fraud, forgery, and bogus checks. The court
stated:
Defense counsel could quite properly have concluded that impeachment of the
credibility of an important prosecution witness by means of a prior conviction
might make the jurors look with greater suspicion on the defendant's testimony
since defendant had a substantial prior record.
Id. at 594, 225 A.2d at 239-40 (citation omitted).
120 People v. Schulman, 299 Ill. 125, 132 N.E. 530 (1921).
121 See United States v. Hammonds, 425 F.2d 597 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
122 See Moore v. United States, 432 F.2d 730 (3d Cir. 1970).
123 Id. at 738. The court in Moore, in remanding for an evidentiary hearing, noted
that there was no indication that counsel tried to substantiate the defendant's claim that
he had been subjected to a lineup, that counsel made any effort to interview the govern-
ment's witnesses in advance of trial, or that counsel had checked out petitioner's claim
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Because of tactical justifications, it would seem a rare case in
which failure to cross-examine a witness, standing alone, would con-
stitute ineffective assistance. There may be circumstances, however,
in which tactical considerations would be deemed unreasonable and
the failure to cross-examine prejudicial. When, for example, counsel
possessed substantial impeachment evidence, such as a prior inconsistent
statement on a material point that could not readily be explained by
a witness, or proof that the government dropped substantial criminal
charges against the witness in exchange for his testimony, or evidence
that the witness had previously been convicted of perjury, and counsel
did not introduce this evidence by cross-examination or otherwise,
ineffective assistance should perhaps be found if there is a reasonable
possibility that the witness's testimony influenced the conviction.
4. Failure To Object to Incompetent Evidence or Comments
Although one court has reversed a conviction when counsel did
not object to the introduction and admission of incompetent evi-
dence, 124 several decisions have affirmed convictions despite this omis-
sion.1 25 A tactical justification given when there was a substantial
possibility that the objection would be overruled was expressed by
the Fifth Circuit in Williams v. Beto:126 "Defense counsel is to be
complimented for remembering that he who often objects, only to
have his objections over-ruled, risks alienating the jury even if he
does not test the patience of the presiding judge." Also, when the
admissibility of testimony is a matter of debate, counsel's failure to
object can be justified by the desire not to emphasize admissible ad-
verse evidence. 27
But what if defense counsel fails to object to clearly incompetent
evidence or improper comments to the jury? When the defense counsel
failed to object to the trial judge's flagrant invasion of the province
of the jury by casting doubt on the credibility of the defendant and
that they had twice been unable to identify him at the lineup and had identified him at
an arraignment on other charges only after an FBI agent pointed him out. Id. at 739.
124 See People v. Gardiner, 303 I. 204, 135 N.E. 422 (1922).
125 See, e.g., Rivera v. United States, 318 F.2d 606 (9th Cir. 1963); Mitchell v. United
States, 259 F.2d 787 (D.C. Cir. 1958); People v. Rettig, 131 Ill. App. 2d 687, 264 N.E.2d
835 (1970), aff'd, 50 Ill. 2d 317, 278 N.E.2d 781 (1972); cf. Sayre v. Commonwealth, 194 Ky.
338, 238 S.W. 737 (1922) (no ineffective assistance found, even though defense counsel
opened door to prejudicial testimony and failed to object to other incompetent testi-
mony).
120 354 F.2d 698, 703 (5th Cir. 1965).




indicating that the defense was without merit and that the defendant's
testimony was false, the court reversed the conviction, finding that coun-
sel's purported representation was "equivalent to or worse than no
representation whatsoever."' 28
In People v. Rettig,129 when counsel did not object to hearsay
evidence of the victim's identity, the Illinois Court of Appeals rec-
ognized that such an objection would probably have been sustained.
Nevertheless, the court speculated that "[i]f the identity of the victim
had been made an issue in this way it might well have been that the
victim's son would have been called to testify, a circumstance unlikely
to have been any benefit to defendant."'18 0 This approach is unsatis-
factory; it rejects the possibility of prejudice by mere conjecture. If
the evidence entered without objection was dearly inadmissible, the
court should have remanded for a determination of prejudice. Only
if it were found that the bad evidence did not contribute to the convic-
tion or that non-hearsay evidence to the same effect could readily have
been adduced would the court have been justified in finding an absence
of prejudice.
When the majority of a panel of the District of Columbia Circuit
Court declined to find ineffective assistance in counsel's failure to object
to hearsay testimony of the mother and grandmother of a seven-year-old
child who had allegedly been raped,31 Judge Fahy said in dissent:
If it be shown in this case that the conviction rests in substan-
tial degree upon untrustworthy hearsay evidence not objected to,
the courts might conclude in the light of this and all other cir-
cumstances of the trial, together with the omission of counsel to
note an appeal, that there was not accorded to appellant his con-
stitutional right to the assistance of counsel in his defense.'3 2
Judge Fahy's approach is consistent with the goal of assuring
adequate representation for defendants. If counsel failed to object to
incompetent evidence, and the admission of such evidence was not
harmless, counsel's failure should be deemed ineffective assistance.
The only ostensible tactical justifications for not objecting to harmful
inadmissible evidence-reluctance to alienate the judge and jury, and
the desire not to emphasize the evidence or to give the impression that
the defense has something to hide-cannot be considered reasonable
128 Wilson v. State, 222 Ind. 63, 83, 51 N.E.2d 848, 856 (1943).
129 131 Ill. App. 2d 687, 264 N.E.2d 835 (1970), aff'd, 50 Ill. 2d 317, 278 NE.2d 781
(1972).
130 131 Ill. App. 2d at 691, 264 N.E.2d at 838.
181 Mitchell v. United States, 259 F.2d 787 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
182 Id. at 795-96 (dissenting opinion).
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excuses for allowing clearly incompetent, prejudicial evidence to go
to the jury.
Counsel's failure to object to improper evidence or instructions
should not always be grounds for reversal. If the admissibility of the
evidence is debatable, the tactical reasons for not objecting may justify
counsel's omission. If the suspect evidence is unimportant, harmless
error might be found. Also, if the government has equally damaging
evidence available which it could have used instead of the inadmissible
evidence, or if the questions could have been rephrased to allow intro-
duction of the same evidence, 1 3 then the failure to object can be
considered harmless.
The traditional approach, whereby counsel is required to make
an objection on the record before an alleged error will be considered
on appeal, is commendable, although the plain error rule is an im-
portant exception to such a requirement.134 Objections should ordinar-
ily be required so that the trial judge has the initial opportunity to
rule on them and thereby avoid falling into error. The defendant is
entitled to have adequate representation by counsel; counsel should
object to any clearly improper evidence or comments that create a
reasonable possibility of contributing to a conviction, unless he has
acceptable tactical reasons for not registering an objection.185 Just as
the plain error rule assumes that the trial judge should exclude evi-
dence under certain circumstances, even without an objection, so too
should the trial judge not require an objection before he takes cog-
nizance of counsel's ineptitude when evidence is obviously inadmissible
and prejudicial; the court should intervene to protect the defendant.13
5. Failure To Raise Particular Defenses
Some courts have held that failure to raise the insanity defense,
the defense of diminished responsibility, or the defense of incompetency
183 For example, in State v. Queen, 73 Wash. 2d 706, 440 P.2d 461 (1968), the court
found that improper questions could have been restated unobjectionably and therefore
that the failure to object did not "clearly" demonstrate incompetence.
184 "Plain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they
were not brought to the attention of the court." FED. R. CRa. P. 52(b).
135 Most objections seem to a jury obstructive and indicative that the defense
does not want the truth told; thus, needless objections merely invite needless bad
will.... On the other hand, if evidence is significantly harmful to the defendant,
it should generally be objected to, despite any adverse effect that objection might
have on a jury or the judge.
2 A. AMsTERDAM, B. SEGAL & M. MILLER, TRIAL MANUAL FOR THME DEFENSE OF CRIMINAL
CASES § 416, at 318-19 (1971).
136 See notes 230-33 and accompanying text infra.
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to stand trial rendered counsel's assistance ineffective.13 7 In Hintz v.
Beto,3 8 counsel did not raise the insanity defense, perhaps because he
had no time to examine the results of a study by a court-appointed
psychiatrist. The Fifth Circuit rejected the state's attempt to explain
by tactical considerations the failure of counsel to raise this defense.
The state argued that by not pleading insanity the defendant avoided
having a note that he had written prior to his arrest admitted into
evidence. The court found this proffered justification weak in light
of a prior confession and the failure of the defense to show the jury
any excuse whatever for the defendant's conduct. The court also found
that there was a factual basis for raising the defense. 3 9
In Goodwin v. Swenson,140 the court determined that if counsel had
made proper inquiry into the defendant's mental condition, he might
well have uncovered evidence which would have established the defense
of incompetency to stand trial and, by implication, insanity at the time
of the offense. In a case before the California Supreme Court,' 4' in
which the failure to raise the diminished responsibility defense was
claimed, counsel had made no substantial factual inquiry into the specif-
ics of the defendant's condition, although he was advised of head in-
juries and organic brain damage. Counsel made no effort to obtain avail-
able medical reports of which he was aware and made no effort to have
petitioner examined by a psychiatrist. The court rejected the argument
that counsel did not raise the diminished responsibility defense because
he wanted to keep the defendant's admissions to. a psychiatrist out of
evidence. The court observed that, although counsel's decision not to
raise the defense was made for tactical reasons "sufficient in counsel's
judgment to support'it, in the circumstances of this case the failure
of counsel to avail himself of information relevant to the defense
removed all rational support from that decision."' 42 This case seems
to suggest that even if counsel might have a tactical justification for
137 See, e.g., Hintz v. Beto, 379 F.2d 937 (5th Cir. 1967) (insanity); McLaughlin v.
Royster, 346 F. Supp. 297 (E.D. Va. 1972) (insanity); Goodwin v. Swenson, 287 F. Supp. 166
(W.D. Mo. 1968) (insanity-incompetency); In re Saunders, 2 Cal. 3d 1033, 472 P.2d 921, 88
Cal. Rptr. 633 (1970) (en banc) (diminished responsibility); People v. McDowell, 69 Cal. 2d
737, 447 P.2d 97, 73 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1968) (diminished responsibility).
138 379 F.2d 937 (5th Cir. 1967).
139 Id. at 942.
140 287 F. Supp. 166, 187 (W.D. Mo. 1968).
141 In re Saunders, 2 Cal. 3d 1033, 472 P.2d 921, 88 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1970) (en banc).
142 Id. at 1049, 472 P.2d at 931, 88 Cal. Rptr. at 643. The court recognized that even
if counsel had made an adequate investigation he might well have concluded that the best
course was to withhold any defense based upon the defendant's mental condition at the
time of the offense. Id. at 1049, 472 P.2d at 932, 88 Cal. Rptr. at 644.
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declining to raise a particular defense, he cannot make a rational deci-
sion unless he has apprised himself of the full strength of other available
defenses.
Other courts have held that counsel's failure to raise the insanity
defense was not ineffective assistance.143 In United States v. Spenard,144
the Second Circuit held that counsel was justified in not raising the
insanity defense in light of the conflicting reports and evidence on
insanity:
[I]t was perfectly proper for defense counsel to exercise his judg-
ment and conclude that it would be better to play upon the jury's
possible sympathy for [the defendant's] mental condition without
becoming involved in a battle of doctors in which there may have
been little likelihood of success. 145
In Snider v. Cunningham,4 8 the Fourth Circuit declined to find
ineffective assistance in counsel's failure to raise the insanity defense even
though evidence of the defendant's mental condition presented a jury
question. The court gave two reasons for its conclusion. First, the
evidence of the defendant's mental condition did "not disclose such an
extreme condition as to require the conclusion that counsel was so
grossly neglectful of the prisoner's interest in failing to rely upon his
mental condition as a defense as to convert the proceedings into a farce
or a mockery of justice."'11 7 The second reason, rooted in a tactical
consideration, was that the insanity defense would have undermined
the defense of alibi.148 The first reason is not persuasive; if counsel
had no other viable defense and if he had enough evidence on in-
sanity to go to the jury, his failure to raise it was inexcusable, for it
deprived the defendant of the chance to have the jury decide whether
the evidence justified acquittal. The second reason is far more per-
suasive; it presents a tactical justification for declining to raise the'
insanity defense with which reasonably competent and experienced
criminal defense lawyers might agree.149
The failure to raise the defense of consent to a charge of rape
143 See, e.g., United States v. Spenard, 438 F.2d 717 (2d Cir. 1971); Snider v. Cunning-
ham, 292 F.2d 683 (4th Cir. 1961).
144 438 F.2d 717 (2d Cir. 1971).
145 Id. at 720.
146 292 F.2d 683 (4th Cir. 1961).
147 Id. at 684-85 (citation omitted).
148 Id. at 685.
149 See People v. Glover, 257 Cal. App. 2d 502, 65 Cal. Rptr. 219 (1967) (counsel's




has been held to be ineffective assistance. 5" In State v. Merchant,151
the defendant persistently maintained in his statements to the police
and to his attorney that the prosecutrix had consented to sexual rela-
tions. Counsel" made no effort to develop this defense and did not in-
vestigate the reputation of the prosecutrix. In finding ineffective
assistance, the court pointed to many circumstances that tended to
support a consent defense-for example, the prosecutrix's delay in re-
porting the alleged offense, the absence of signs or marks of violence,
the fact that the defendant after leaving the alleged victim's house did
not behave as if he felt in any danger of being apprehended, the fact
that the defendant was known to the prosecutrix from previous con-
versations, the fact that he had no criminal record, and that despite
being of slight education and low intelligence, he made an exculpatory
statement after six and one-half hours of interrogation. 152
Such findings should be unnecessary. If the defendant wants to
raise a consent defense to a rape charge by his own testimony alone,
counsel's refusal to allow the defendant to raise this defense should be
deemed ineffective assistance in the absence of a showing of tactical rea-
sons with which criminal defense lawyers of some experience might agree.
If the defendant has an arguably effective alibi defense, a valid tactical
reason for not presenting the consent defense would be that it is wholly
inconsistent with the alibi. On the other hand, if the state has made
out a strong case and if the defendant has no other defense, no way of
demonstrating insufficiency in the state's case, and no other witnesses
to testify to consent, the defendant has nothing to lose and everything
to gain by testifying. In most cases of this type, it is an insufficient
tactical reason for counsel to claim that he did not let the defendant
testify because of fear of impeachment by evidence of prior crimes.
In. a case in which counsel did not raise the intoxication defense
to a charge of first degree murder, 53 the court concluded that counsel's
decision was justified by his concern that the witnesses would not be
credible, that their testimony would not tend to establish the defendant's
incapacity, and that the jury would be prejudiced by testimony tending
to indicate that the defendant was on a drunken spree.5 4 These are
sufficient reasons for not raising the defense.
150 See, e.g., Smallwood v. Warden, 205 F. Supp. 325 (D. Md. 1962); State v. Merchant,
10 Md. App. 545, 271 A.2d 752 (1970).
151 10 Md. App. 545, 271 A.2d 752 (1970).
152 Id. at 557-59, 271 A.2d at 758-59.
1 Tahl v. O'Connor, 336 F. Supp. 576 (S.D. Cal. 1971).
1% Id. at 586-87.
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The District of Columbia Circuit Court rejected an ineffective
assistance claim when counsel did not raise an alibi defense by failing
to subpoena, call, or examine alibi witnesses-one Isola Magriver and
a friend known as "Ham"-whom the defendant claimed he and an
original codefendant, named Galloway, were with at a distant place
at the time of the alleged offense. 155 Galloway, against whom the charges
were dropped, recanted the alibi evidence he had given at the pre-
liminary hearing when he was still a suspect. The court said:
We do not know why trial counsel did not subpoena Mag-
river, whose address was not given, or "Ham," whose real name
was unknown. He may well have decided, in view of Galloway's
recantation, that as a matter of trial tactics it would be better not
to present the alleged alibi. Whatever the reason for it, the decision
was for the judgment of counsel and should not now be the
basis for a charge of inefficiency. 56
This decision is erroneous if it is assumed that the defendant had
no other substantial defenses with which the alibi defense would be
inconsistent. The court should have remanded for findings by the
lower court on the extent to which counsel made an effort to locate
the two witnesses, what inquiries he made of them if they were located,
and why he decided not to call them as witnesses.. If counsel did not
attempt to locate these witnesses, ineffective assistance should be found
if a reasonably thorough investigation would have located the indi-
viduals, and one or both of them would have testified in support of
the alibi. Under these circumstances, prejudice would be apparent
since there would be a reasonable possibility of presenting enough
evidence to get the defense to the jury. 57
This standard may appear different from the constitutional harm-
'55 Bolden v. United States, 266 F.2d 460 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
156 Id. at 461.
157 It may be asked why the test should be different when there is enough time but
counsel has not investigated, than when counsel did not have enough time to investigate.
In the former case, the defendant must show that investigation would have turned up
enough evidence to get a defense to a jury; in the latter case, the late appointment of
counsel should create a prima fade case of prejudice. The difference is that in the former
case counsel is entitled to some discretion as to how intensive an investigation to make.
To find ineffective assistance in counsel's discretionary choice not to pursue a particular
factual inquiry by applying a prima fade presumption of prejudice, when time permitted
an investigation, would be to ignore counsel's discretion. Instead, the defendant should
have the burden, albeit minimal, of showing that investigation might reasonably have
been expected to turn up a defense. On the other hand, when counsel has spent palpably
inadequate time consulting with his client, the prima facie rule should apply. It is clearly




less error test. In practice, however, the harmless error test and the
"enough evidence to get to a jury" test usually lead to the same result.
If there is enough evidence to get to a jury, there ordinarily would be a
reasonable possibility that the defendant would be acquitted.
One court has held that counsel was warranted in not raising an
entrapment defense when counsel had considered the defense but
concluded that the facts did not justify its introduction."8 Another
court, in dealing with the complaint that counsel failed to raise the
entrapment defense, remanded the case for a hearing at which the
defendant would have the burden of establishing that there was no
reasonable basis for counsel's failure to submit this defense.'6 9 The
court enunciated a very strict standard of prejudice-that the convic-
tion would be set aside only if counsel's omission probably changed
the result of the trial' 60-but found that if counsel's omission was not
justified in this case, it probably would have affected the outcome of
the trial.
As previously noted, failure to raise the defense of statutory in-
applicability has been held to be ineffective assistance when there
was strong legal justification for believing that the defense would
succeed. 61
Finally, failure to call witnesses to establish lack of motive to
commit a crime has been held in at least one instance not to be in-
effective assistance, even if counsel erroneously believed that such
evidence was inadmissible or of no benefit to the defendant. -62 The
court in that case gave a rote citation to the farce, mockery, or sham
test,16 3 and analyzed the problem no further. The test suggested here
would require first an inquiry into whether counsel was reasonably
justified in believing that lack of motive evidence would be inadmis-
sible, of doubtful credibility, or of little use to the defendant. If
counsel were not so justified, then the test is whether there is a rea-
sonable possibility that failure to call such witnesses contributed to
the conviction.
Counsel who does not raise any defenses should be deemed in-
158 See Cofield v. United States, 263 F.2d 686, 690-91 (9th Cir.), rev'd per curiam, 360
U.S. 472 (1959).
159 See State v. White, 5 Wash. App. 283, 487 P.2d 243 (1971), rev'd, 81 Wash. 2d 223,
500 P.2d 1242 (1972).
160 This standard has been considered and rejected. See note 157 and accompanying
text supra.
161 In re Williams, 1 Cal. 3d 168, 460 P.2d 984, 81 Cal. Rptr. 984 (1969) (en banc).
162 See Borchert v. United States, 405 F.2d 735 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S.
972 (1969).
163 See note 8 and accompanying text supra.
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competent if he had enough evidence to raise a defense which could
get to the jury. Counsel should not have to raise all possible defenses-
if he has a relatively strong defense he is justified in not wishing to
dilute its force by further argument for a weaker defense. If counsel
has two or more defenses of relatively equal strength, he will be
justified in not raising inconsistent defenses. But if defense counsel
does not raise a defense which any competent criminal lawyer would
conclude is far stronger than the defenses he does raise, counsel's
dereliction should be deemed ineffective assistance. This last situation
will be relatively rare since there is usually room for debate as to
which of several possible defenses is stronger.
6. Failure To Make Adequate Closing Arguments
In United States v. Hammonds,64 counsel made a pro forma clos-
ing argument in which he said absolutely nothing on behalf of the
defendant. The court, in finding a lack of adequate assistance of coun-
sel, pointed out what the defendant's new counsel indicated his trial
counsel should have said but failed to mention in his closing argument:
[He] should at least have mentioned the presumption of innocence
and the requirement that all essential elements of the offenses be
proved beyond a reasonable doubt; . . .he should have pointed
out to the jury the evidence which could lead to a conclusion that
appellant lacked the requisite intent and also the absence of evi-
dence establishing that a person was present at the house at the
time of the appellant's entry.165
Another court found ineffective assistance when counsel made no argu-
ment at all, even though the evidence might have supported a provoca-
tion defense.1 6
In Matthews v. United States, 67 the District of Columbia Circuit
Court found that counsel's casual summation to the jury was constitu-
tional error so prejudicial to the defendant as to require a reversal of his
conviction, even though there was strong evidence of his guilt. How-
ever, in People v. Dudley, 68 in which defense counsel made no closing
argument, the Illinois Supreme Court said that despite "the rather
extraordinary waiver of final argument, the petition contains nothing
to show how, considering the complete evidence of guilt, the trial's
164 425 F.2d 597 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
165 Id. at 603 (citation omitted).
166 Johns v. Smyth, 176 F. Supp. 949 (E.D. Va. 1959).
167 449 F.2d 985, 992 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
168 46 Ill. 2d 805, 263 N.E.2d 1 (1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 910 (1971).
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outcome might have been different had the attorney pursued another
tactic."10 9
The test of prejudice should be the same in these circumstances
as in those in which counsel failed to raise a defense and such failure
had no tactical justification. If no closing argument was made, or if it
was merely perfunctory, including nothing that would give the defen-
dant a reasonable possibility of acquittal or even a hung jury, and there
was an argument that counsel could have presented that would have
created a reasonable possibility of avoiding conviction, counsel's dere-
liction should be deemed a lack of effective assistance unless it can be
justified by tactical reasons.170 One such tactical justification for defense
counsel's waiver of closing argument is sometimes present when the
prosecution makes the initial closing argument and a second closing
argument in rebuttal of the defendant's argument. As pointed out in
a leading trial tactics manual:
Technically, the prosecutor's rebuttal is limited to rebutting.
He is allowed some latitude to go beyond reply to defense counsel,
however, and many prosecutors abuse this latitude by making a
short initial dosing and saving their big tirades for "rebuttal."
Sometimes counsel may want to destroy this tactic by waiving
dosing argument, with the comment that neither the prosecution's
case nor its argument appears to demand reply. This leaves the
prosecutor in dry-dock.17'
7. Failure To Request Instructions
One court has suggested that counsel's failure to request a cau-
tionary instruction as to the testimony of an accomplice could amount
to ineffective assistance.172 Other courts have held that counsel's failure
to request an instruction as to a lesser offense supported by the evi-
dence could be justified by a legitimate strategy of going for an "all
or nothing" verdict and by the desire not to give the jury a second
chance to convict.173 This approach seems valid as long as there is a
reasonable possibility that under the evidence the defendant will be
169 Id. at 309, 263 N.E.2d at 34.
170 I do not suggest a test that would find ineffective assistance if there is anything
at all that would create a reasonable probability of avoiding conviction that counsel could
have argued but did not. Counsel is justified in using his discretion to argue what he
thinks will be most effective and to forego weaker arguments.
171 2 A. AsfrRDAM, B. SEGAL & M. MILLER, supra note 135, § 444, at 341.
172 See People v. Georgev, 38 Ill. 2d 165, 230 N.E.2d 851 (1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S.
998 (1968).
173 Seee.g., State v. Fulford, 290 Minn. 236, 187 N.W.2d 270 (1971); People v. Byers,
10 Cal. App. 3d 410, 88 Cal. Rptr. 886 (1970).
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acquitted of the more serious offense. However, even though the gov-
ernment's case as to the more serious offense is overwhelming,174 if
there is also evidence that could support a conviction of a lesser of-
fense, so that the judge would have to give an instruction if requested,
counsel's failure to request a lesser offense instruction should be con-
sidered ineffective assistance.
8. Counsel Involved in a Conflict of Interest
When counsel jointly represents two or more codefendants and
a conflict of interest exists in representation, ineffective assistance will
be found.175 In Glasser v. United States,176 the Supreme Court reversed
the conviction of one of two codefendants represented by the same
counsel, finding that counsel declined cross-examination of a witness
adverse to the defendant-appellant in order to protect his other client
and indicated that specific prejudice need not be shown. The Court
emphasized the defendant's contention that counsel failed to object to
hearsay for fear that an objection on his behalf would leave the jury
with the impression that the testimony was true as to the codefen-
dant.177 In United States v. Harris, 78 joint representation by one at-
torney was found to be ineffective assistance when he advised the
defendant to testify only because his testimony would tend to exculpate
the codefendant.
Many courts, however, apparently ignoring the language in Glasser
as to the lack of necessity of showing specific prejudice, 179 and im-
174 There may be cases in which the evidence against a defendant is legally or fac-
tually overwhelming, but on an emotional level the thrust of the case suggests a fair pos-
sibility of acquittal, e.g., in mercy killings. In such cases, defense counsel would be justified
in not requesting a lesser included offense instruction since he has at least a possibility of
obtaining an outright acquittal if the jury is faced with an "all or nothing" decision.
175 See, e.g., Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942); United States v. Harris, 155
F. Supp. 17 (S.D. Cal. 1957), aft'd, 261 F.2d 792 (9th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 933
(1959). On appeal, conflict of interest has also been found to render assistance ineffective.
See Randazzo v. United States, 339 F.2d 79 (5th Cir. 1964).
176 315 U.S. 60 (1942).
177 Id. at 73-74.
178 155 F. Supp. 17 (S.D. Cal. 1957), aff'd, 261 F.2d 792 (9th Cir. 1958), cert. denied,
360 U.S. 933 (1959).
179 To determine the precise degree of prejudice sustained by [defendants] as a
result of the court's appointment of [the same counsel as his codefendant] is at
once difficult and unnecessary. The right to have the assistance of counsel is too
fundamental and absolute to allow courts to indulge in nice calculations as to the
amount of prejudice arising from its denial.
315 U.S. at 75-76 (dictum).
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plicitly looking to the actual showing of prejudice in that case,8 0 have
found no conflict of interest in joint representation by one attorney. 18 1
In Peek v. United States,18 2 the Ninth Circuit found that there was
nothing to indicate that counsel "had to, or that he in fact did, slight
the defense of one defendant for that of the other. The interests of
[the defendants] ... were not in conflict with each other."'1 3 In Sanders
v. United States,1 4 the Fourth Circuit found no conflict of interest be-
cause there was no evidence offered in the codefendant's behalf and it
did not appear that he had any interest adverse to the establishment of
the defendant's alibi.
Conflict of interest has also been found when counsel represented,
in a proceeding concerning improper handling and disposition of
narcotics, both the defendant and the narcotics officer who was a central
figure in the case against the defendant and who would have to be
implicated to establish entrapment,8 5 and when counsel failed to cross-
examine a prosecution witness because of a prior attorney-client rela-
tionship. 86 In the former situation, the Fifth Circuit stated that effec-
tive representation is lacking
if counsel, unknown to the accused and without his knowledgeable
assent, is in a duplicitous position where his full talents-as a
vigorous advocate having the single aim of acquittal by all means
fair and honorable-are hobbled or fettered or restrained by
commitments to others.187
When there is joint representation, the test of prejudice should be
whether there is any reasonable possibility that counsel's representa-
tion of the codefendant adversely affected the defense of the defendant.
Such a test would evaluate counsel's cross-examination of witnesses,
presentation of defense testimony, and closing arguments to the jury.
18O See text accompanying note 177 supra.
181 See, e.g., Peek v. United States, 821 F.2d 934 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S.
954 (1964); United States v. Bentvena, 319 F.2d 916 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 940
(1963); Lebron v. United States, 229 F.2d 16 (D.C. Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 974
(1956); Lott v. United States, 218 F.2d 675 (5th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 953 (1956);
Sanders v. United States, 183 F.2d 748 (4th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 921 (1951);
United States ex rel. Green v. Rundle, 305 F. Supp. 523 (E.D. Pa. 1969), remanded for
hearing, 434 F.2d 1112 (3d Cir. 1970), new trial ordered, 326 F. Supp. 456 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
182 321 F.2d 934 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 954 (1964).
183 321 F.2d at 944.
184 183 F.2d 748, 749 (4th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 921 (1951).
185 See Porter v. United States, 298 F.2d 461 (5th Cir. 1962), aff'd per curiam after new
trial, 339 F.2d 258 (5th Cir. 1964).
180 See Tucker v. United States, 235 F.2d 238 (9th Cir. 1956).
187 Porter v. United States, 298 F.2d 461, 463 (5th Cir. 1962).
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9. Other Purported Failings of Defense Counsel
Among the derelictions of defense counsel which courts have
found to constitute or to contribute to a finding of ineffective assistance,
or to require at least a hearing on the defendant's claim, are: failure of
counsel to examine a psychiatrist's report; 88 failure to object to the
trial of his client in a jail uniform; 189 failure to examine an expert
witness properly;190 counsel's stipulation that the court could consider,
during a bench trial for carrying a concealed weapon, the defendant's
testimony given at a hearing on a ulotion to suppress, which amounted
to a judicial confession and deprived the defendant of any defense he
might have had;191 failure to object to or comment on the govern-
ment's failure to call two eyewitnesses; 192 failure to obtain the defen-
dant's work records, which might have corroborated his alibi;1 93 and
counsel's motion for a mistrial without authorization by the defendant
when counsel knew of the defendant's perjured testimony. 9 4
Counsel's failure to advise the defendant of time limitations and
rights to appeal, to appointed counsel, and to a free transcript on appeal
has constituted a denial of adequate representation: 195
[A] waiver of right to appeal cannot intelligently be made in the
absence of counsel's examining the trial proceedings and, if nec-
essary, researching the law for possible errors and thereafter ad-
monishing the defendant of the possibilities for relief, or lack
thereof, which an appeal would afford him. This is not requiring
too much of trial counsel.196
The defendant's desire to pursue an appeal must be accommodated by
counsel.197 Another court found ineffective assistance when the defen-
188 See Brooks v. Texas, 381 F.2d 619 (5th Cir. 1967). See also Hintz v. Beto, 379 F.2d
937 (5th Cir. 1967).
189 See Brooks v. Texas, 381 F.2d 619 (5th Cir. 1967).
190 See People v. Bennett, 29 N.Y.2d 462, 280 N.E.2d 637, 329 N.Y.S.2d 801 (1972).
Counsel was unable, even after the judge gave him additional time, to rephrase the hypo-
thetical question for the psychiatrist he had called to the stand, and finally had to use the
prosecution's question, which was designed to elicit testimony that the defendant was sane.
191 See People v. Martin, 115 Ill. App. 2d 402, 252 N.E2d 722 (1969).
192 See Moore v. United States, 432 F.2d 730 (3d Cir. 1970).
193 See United States ex rel. Green v. Rundle, 305 F. Supp. 523 (E.D. Pa. 1969), re-
manded for rehearing, 434 F.2d 1112 (3d Cir. 1970), new trial ordered, 326 F. Supp. 456
(E.D. Pa. 1971).
194 See McKissick v. United States, 379 F.2d 754 (5th Cir. 1967).
195 Smotherman v. Beto, 276 F. Supp. 579 (N.D. Tex. 1967).
1906 Id. at 585.
197 Id. See also Turner v. Maryland, 303 F.2d 507 (4th Cir. 1962); Turner v. Warden,
220 Md. 669, 155 A.2d 69 (1959), cert. denied, 864 U.S. 885 (1960). But see Kime v. Brewer,
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dant refused an appeal because his counsel erroneously advised him
that a successful appeal might result in a subsequent prosecution for
second-degree murder resulting in a much harsher sentence.', 8 This
court, in ordering that an out-of-time direct appeal be granted, did
not discuss the question of prejudice. It is suggested that there is a
sufficient showing of prejudice in such a case as long as there are
arguable points of error.
Ineffective assistance of appellate counsel has also been held to be
an appropriate ground for relief. In In re Smith,0 9 the California Su-
preme Court found that representation in the district court of appeal
was demonstrably inadequate. The court observed that "in a case
bristling with arguable claims of error, petitioner's counsel filed an
opening brief consisting of a 20-page recitation of the facts and a one-
page argument [which was frivolous]." 200 The court held that petitioner
need not establish that he was entitled to reversal in order to show
that he was prejudiced by counsel's ineptitude.20 1 The court implied
that a showing of potential assignments of error, none of which counsel
raised, that arguably might have justified a reversal would be sufficient.
This opinion should not be taken to mean that if counsel has several
potentially arguable points of error and he raises some, but foregoes
others, the appellant has been denied effective assistance. Counsel is
certainly acting well within the range of his legitimate professional
discretion in judging what points of error would be most likely to
persuade an appellate court and what points would only detract from
the force of his argument. 202
Many lapses of counsel do not constitute ineffective assistance.
Claims of inadequate representation have been rejected when counsel
failed to object to leading questions,20 3 when reputation witnesses were
182 N.W.2d 154 (Iowa 1970) (counsel's failure to perfect appeal did not amount to in-
effective assistance).
108 See Stewart v. Wainwright, 809 F. Supp. 1028 (M.D. Fla. 1969).
190 3 Cal. 3d 192, 471 P.2d 8, 87 Cal. Rptr. 687 (1970).
200 Id. at 198, 471 P.2d at 11, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 690.
201 Id. at 202, 471 P.2d at 14, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 694.
202 See Cardarella v. United States, 375 F.2d 222, 230 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S.
884 (1967):
[C]ounsel is under no duty to brief every assignment of error made in a motion
for new trial, particularly where, as here, there is no prejudice in fact, and coun-
sel's own experience and the precedents ... indicate the point would not be sus-
tained, and there are other assignments of error which counsel believes to be more
meritorious.
203 See Harris v. United States, 239 F.2d 612 (5th Cir. 1957); People v. Byers, l0 Cal.
App. 3d 410, 88 Cal. Rptr. 886 (1970).
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not called,204 when the defendant was not put on the witness stand,2 5
when counsel stipulated that the owner of a vehicle would testify that he
was the owner, had custody of it, and had given no permission to unlock
it,206 when counsel was prevented by the trial court from presenting
certain arguments to the jury or asking irrelevant questions,207 when
a timely motion to quash an indictment was not made,208 and when
counsel was under the influence of intoxicating liquor during the
course of the trial.209
Most of these actions or inactions of trial counsel can be justified
by tactical reasons or found not to be reversible error because of a
lack of prejudice. When counsel did not object to leading questions
to a young girl who was the alleged victim of a rape, the court noted
that if counsel had objected frequently, such objections might well have
engendered a negative attitude toward the defendant in the minds of
the jury.210 Leading questions might also go uncontested in order to
allow a witness the opportunity inadvertently to impeach his own
testimony or because the same material could readily be elicited with-
out leading questions. Counsel's failure to call reputation witnesses
may be justified by a desire not to put the defendant's reputation in
issue.211 Counsel's decision not to put the defendant on the witness
stand may be justified by such-motives as not bringing out prejudicial
impeachment evidence against the defendant 212 or not subjecting the
defendant to the hazards of vigorous cross-examination. 218 This decision
may also be justified by a concern that the general demeanor of the
defendant and his inability to testify convincingly would make him
appear guilty.214 The stipulation as to the testimony of an owner of a
204 See Norman v. United States, 100 F.2d 905 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 306 U.S. 660
(1939).
205 See United States v. Garguilo, 324 F.2d 795 (2d Cir. 1963); Norman v. United
States, 100 F.2d 905 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 306 U.S. 660 (1939).
206 See United States ex rel. Hayes v. Johnston, 330 F. Supp. 1115 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
207 See Reid v. United States, 334 F.2d 915 (9th Cir. 1964).
208 See Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91 (1955).
209 See Hudspeth v. McDonald, 120 F.2d 962 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 962
(1941). The court based its finding on two considerations: (1) that the defendant employed
counsel of his own choosing, and (2) that the defendant did not call his counsel's condi-
tion to the attention of the trial court. 120 F.2d at 968. See also People v. Gourdin, 108
Cal. App. 333, 291 P. 701 (1930).
210 See Harris v. United States, 239 F.2d 612, 615 (5th Cir. 1957).
211 See Norman v. United States, 100 F.2d 905, 906 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 306 Us.
660 (1939).
212 See 100 F.2d at 906.
213 See United States v. Garguilo, 324 F.2d 795 (2d Cir. 1963).
214 See C. TESSMER, supra note 100, at 86.
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vehicle is not prejudicial if in fact the owner would have given the
testimony stipulated to.215 Indeed, a stipulation can avoid the impact
of direct testimony by a particularly convincing witness. When counsel
is properly disallowed from making certain arguments or asking cer-
tain questions, it cannot be said that this creates a reasonable possibility
of contributing to the conviction. But when counsel did not make a
timely motion to quash an indictment on the basis of discriminatory
selection of the grand jury, the court gave a very unconvincing ex-
planation of counsel's failure, reasoning that "the delay might be con-
sidered sound trial strategy, particularly since the co-defendant could
not be found."216 If a timely motion would have had a reasonable
possibility of success, counsel's failure to make it should be considered
ineffective assistance, since there is no defensible tactical reason for
counsel's omission.217
Many cases suggest that when counsel is retained, a greater show-
ing of incompetency is required than when counsel is appointed.21
Although no court has articulated different standards for reviewing
the performance of retained or appointed counsel, cases indicate that
the action of retained counsel is the action of the client and binds the
client unless he voices a specific objection to such actions.2 19 The view
that retained counsel is the agent of the defendant and that such
counsel's incompetence cannot be considered state action has been
severely criticized by Professor Jon Waltz:
The agency rationale whereby the conduct of retained counsel
is imputed to an accused constitutes a concept gone astray ....
The logical-moral underpinnings of a principal's liability to an
innocent third party for the acts of the principal's agent vanish
when the agency concept is superimposed on the attorney-client
relationship in criminal cases; there is no innocent beneficiary of
215 See United States ex rel. Hayes v. Johnston, 380 F. Supp. 1115 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
216 Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101 (1955).
217 The Fifth Circuit upheld a challenge to the composition of the jury on the
ground that blacks were systematically excluded, despite the fact that counsel did not
raise this issue at trial or on appeal, and that the claim had been rejected by the state
court and by the federal district court. United States ex rel. Goldsby v. Harpole, 249
F.2d 417 (5th Cir. 1957).
218 See, e.g., O'Malley v. United States, 285 F.2d 733 (6th Cir. 1961); Stanley v.
United States, 239 F.2d 765 (9th Cir. 1956) (per curiam); United States ex rel. Darcy v,
Handy, 203 F.2d 407 (3d Cir. 1953), aff'd, 351 U.S. 454 (1956); Weatherman v. Peyton,
287 F. Supp. 819 (W.D. Va. 1968); United States ex reL. Wilkins v. Banmiller, 205 F. Supp,
123 (E.D. Pa. 1962), aff'd, 325 F.2d 514 (3d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 847 (1964); Peo-
ple v. Washington, 41 Ill. 2d 16, 241 N.E.2d 425 (1968); Sayre v. Commonwealth, 194 Ky.
338, 238 S.W. 737 (1922).
219 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Darcy v. Handy, 203 F.2d 407 (3d Cir. 1953), aff'd,
351 U.S. 454 (1956); Sayre v. Commonwealth, 194 Ky. 338, 238 S.W. 737 (1922).
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the accused's agency-born liability for the ineptitude of his re-
tained attorney-agent. Moreover ... the principal-agent relation-
ship presupposes a principal sufficiently informed to direct and
supervise his agent....
- - [It] assuredly is not possible to avoid the unmistakable
onset of state action . . . when, through its judicial machinery,
the state convicts an accused and passes sentence upon him on the
basis of a trial so miserably conducted by retained defense counsel
as to fall below the due process line. Here, graphically speaking,
there may be as much as 2,300 volts of state action.220
The retained/appointed distinction has been rejected by a number of
courts.221 Such rejection is clearly the better-considered view.
The limitation that ineffective assistance will not be found unless
the defendant has apprised the trial court of his objections to counsel's
performance or unless counsel's incompetence is apparent to the trial
court, has been expressed in numerous opinions.222 In United States
ex rel. Wilkins v. Banmiller,223 the court found no state action because
the trial court, in accepting a guilty plea, was unaware that counsel
had misrepresented to his client the fact that a deal had been made for
a light sentence. Other courts have held that counsel's incompetence
must be so manifest "that it becomes the duty of the court or the
prosecution to observe it and correct it. ' ' 224 These cases rest primarily
on indefensible agency and state action theories, 225 and usually have
involved retained counsel. 226
220 Waltz, supra note 1, at 297-99.
221 See, e.g., Blanchard v. Brewer, 429 F.2d 89 (8th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S.
1002 (1971); United States ex rel. Maselli v. Reincke, 383 F.2d 129 (2d Cir. 1967); Wilson v.
Rose, 366 F.2d 611 (9th Cir. 1966); Abraham v. State, 228 Ind. 179, 91 N.E.2d 358 (1950).
222 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Darcy v. Handy, 203 F.2d 407, 425-28 (3d Cir. 1953)
(Maris, J., concurring), aff'd, 851 U.S. 454 (1956); Tompsett v. Ohio, 146 F.2d 95 (6th Cir.
1944), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 869 (1945); Hudspeth v. McDonald, 120 F.2d 962 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 314 U.S. 617 (1941); Sayre v. Commonwealth, 194 Ky. 838, 238 S.W. 737 (1922).
See also Nutt v. United States, 335 F.2d 817 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 909 (1964).
People v. Tomaselli, 7 N.Y.2d 350, 165 N.E2d 551, 197 N.Y.S.2d 697 (1960) (ineffective
assistance claim must be rejected unless responsibility can be attributed to the court or
prosecution).
228 205 F. Supp. 123 (E.D. Pa. 1962), afJ'd, 325 F.2d 514 (8d Cir. 1963), cert. denied,
379 U.S. 847 (1964).
224 Williams v. Beto, 354 F.2d 698, 704 (5th Cir. 1965); see In re Ernst, 294 F.2d 556,
558 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 864 U.S. 943 (1961).
225 In United States ex rel. Wilkins v. Banmiller, 205 F. Supp. 123, 128 (E.D. Pa. 1962),
the court said that the state must play a part in the wrong done to the accused if the
ineffective assistance claim is to be sustained.
226 For example, in Tompsett v. Ohio, 146 F.2d 95, 98 (6th Cir. 1944), the court stated:
[lhe lack of skill and incompetency of the attorney is imputed to the defendant
who employed him, the acts of the attorney thus becoming those of his client and
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In addition to the arguments against the state action and agency
theories, the requirement that the defendant make manifest to the trial
judge his objections to counsel's performance assumes, without justifica-
tion, that the defendant at his trial was aware of his counsel's deficien-
cies and that he can appreciate the fact that his counsel's performance
was incompetent. Yet the defendant may not be aware of such matters as
his counsel's ignorance of the law or his failure to investigate the facts
adequately, and may not appreciate such matters as the viable defenses
which counsel might have raised but did not. The defendant may also
fail to raise an objection to counsel's performance because of a belief,
shared by many criminal defendants, that his counsel, the prosecut-
ing attorney, and the trial judge are all part of the same club-the
establishment-and that they will listen to nothing he has to say re-
garding counsel's deficiencies.
The requirement that counsel's inadequacies be brought to the
attention of the trial court, although not defensible, does contain
positive implications which should be followed. First, if the defendant
does make a motion for dismissal of his counsel, the trial court should
allow him to state why he thinks his counsel is ineffective, 227 since the
"defendant may have knowledge of conduct and events relevant to
the diligence and competence of his attorney which are not apparent
to the trial judge from observations within the four corners of the
courtroom. " 228 More important, as the Fifth Circuit in MacKenna v.
Ellis229 suggested: "Fundamental fairness to a person accused of crime
requires such judicial guidance of the conduct of a trial that when it
becomes apparent . . . counsel are not protecting the accused, the
trial judge should move in and protect him." 230 One device for protect-
ing the accused has been suggested earlier: before accepting a guilty
plea, the court should make inquiry of counsel as to what transpired
between him and his client and what factual and legal investigations
were made.231
Second, as several cases have stated or implied, when the defen-
dant chooses to go to trial, the judge has a duty to protect him.232
This does not mean that the judge should intervene in the defense of the
so recognized and accepted by the court, unless the defendant repudiates them
by making known to the court at the time his objection to or lack of concurrence
in them.
227 See People v. Marsden, 2 Cal. 3d 118, 465 P.2d 44, 84 Cal. Rptr. 156 (1970).
228 Id. at 123, 465 P.2d at 47, 84 Cal. Rptr. at 159.
229 280 F.2d 592 (5th Cir. 1960), modified, 289 F.2d 928, cert. denied, 368 U.S. 877 (1961).
230 280 F.2d at 600.
231 See note 34 and accompanying text supra.
232 See note 230 and accompanying text supra.
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accused when the propriety of counsel's conduct is debatable. Or-
dinarily, the trial judge should be the disinterested arbiter of the
adversary process and should rely on counsel for both sides to use their
best efforts, judgments, and skills. But trial judges should, nevertheless,
be alert to such matters as counsel's failure to object to incompetent
evidence, failure to cross-examine witnesses, failure to request a lesser
offense instruction, and failure to make an adequate closing argu-
ment. If the judge cannot discern any reasonable tactical basis for
counsel's evidently prejudicial conduct, he should intervene by ex-
amining defense counsel, outside the presence of the prosecution, on
the basis for his action or inaction. If counsel comes forward with a
justification that no reasonably competent criminal defense attorney
might agree with, then the court should suggest what more advan-
tageous action counsel might take.233 If counsel persists in rendering
prejudicial ineffective assistance, the court should declare a mistrial.
II
SUGGESTIONS To ASSURE MORE EFFECTIVE REPRESENTATION
BY DEFENSE COUNSEL
Whenever defense counsel renders ineffective assistance, it is a
disgrace to our system of justice, a system which promises a fair trial
to all criminal defendants. Setting aside a conviction does not com-
pletely remove the stain caused by denial of the opportunity to make
a vigorous defense by all fair means. The only satisfactory solution is
the elimination of incompetent defense counsel. As suggested earlier,
many attorneys are simply not prepared or equipped by training,
knowledge, experience, or inclination to defend criminal cases. Crim-
inal defense work is a highly specialized endeavor. To practice this
specialty, an attorney should be required to pass a special examination
dealing with criminal procedure, evidence, and trial tactics. The
examination should go well beyond what is ordinarily covered in the
criminal law and evidence portions of the bar examination. It should
include, inter alia: (1) the elements of crimes, (2) the elements of de-
233 It has been suggested that the court should not intervene to protect the defendant
because such intervention might seriously prejudice the defendant by placing his counsel
in a bad light. See People v. Stephens, 6 III. 2d 257, 128 N.E.2d 731 (1955). But this
possibility is minimized by the fact that the trial judge can make discreet inquiries of
defense counsel outside the hearing of the jury. Moreover, the prejudice caused by
incompetent counsel, sufficient to move the trial court to intervene, is far more serious
than any prejudice resulting from plating counsel in a bad light.
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fenses, such as insanity, diminished responsibility, intoxication, pro-
vocation, mistake, self-defense, and entrapment, (3) the constitutional
bases for assailing statutes, such as the vagueness doctrine and first
amendment violations, (4) the constitutional criminal procedure, in-
cluding the law of search and seizure, limitations on admissibility of
confessions, electronic eavesdropping, and line-up identifications, and
(5) the local rules of criminal procedure dealing with such matters as
discovery, bail, defenses raised before trial, preliminary hearings, bases
for challenging indictments, and bills of particulars. In addition to
these matters, the attorney should be tested in the traditional areas
of evidence law and on his ability to frame questions properly, to
conduct a proper cross-examination, to present expert testimony, to
handle and present documents and letters, to frame objections, and to
make an adequate jury presentation.234
This examination should be given to all attorneys who wish to
be appointed to criminal cases, to represent criminal defendants on
retainer, or to work in public defender offices. 235 Although it may be
argued that an examination requirement will discourage lawyers from
taking criminal cases, there are a number of law school graduates each
year who wish to practice criminal law, at least part time, and public
defender offices are swamped with applications for full-time positions.23 6
In addition to passing a special criminal defense examination,
an attorney, before being permitted to represent a defendant in a
felony case, should be required to have a certain amount of experience.
Several courts have considered the inexperience of counsel as a factor
234 See generally Burger, A Sick Profession, Wis. B. BuLL., Oct. 1969, at 7-118.
235 Although the federal courts do not give a bar examination, there is a distinct
body of criminal law and procedure in the federal system. It is recommended that the
judicial conferences of each circuit appoint a committee to prepare and administer a
criminal defense examination. Perhaps to avoid unnecessary inconvenience to lawyers
who practice in more than one federal circuit, successful completion of an examination
in one circuit should qualify an attorney to practice in any circuit, even though criminal
law doctrines vary in certain respects from circuit to circuit.
236 Another tool for encouraging lawyers to qualify as criminal defense specialists
and for ensuring more effective assistance of counsel is to make sure that the fee or
salary paid to assigned counsel and public defenders, respectively, is comparable to the
going rate for retained counsel or at least to the salaries paid public prosecutors. Counsel
is more likely to be attracted to indigent criminal defense work and to spend adequate
time on such cases if he is adequately compensated. If more funds are allocated to public
defender offices, more attorneys can be hired, and the heavy caseloads which currently
burden attorneys in those offices can be reduced to a reasonable level.
The value we place on any institution or system is no higher than the price we are
willing to pay for its effective functioning. Certainly our society places a very high value
on the ideal of a fair trial. Society ought to be willing to spend whatever it takes to
guarantee the implementation of that ideal.
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contributing to the finding of ineffective assistance.237 In one case in
which ineffective assistance was found because counsel had no op-
portunity to discuss the case with his client, the court found it signifi-
cant that counsel had graduated from law school only the year before,
had been admitted to the bar the year of the trial, and was handling
his first criminal case.238 In another case, in which numerous deficien-
cies in the representation of the defendant were held to constitute
inadequate assistance, the court observed that the unassisted representa-
tion of indigents should not be used as a training method for the
neophyte lawyer.23 9 The Fifth Circuit has observed that "a trial judge
who appoints fledgling attorneys as defense counsel, over the defen-
dant's protest, cannot wash his hands of their mistakes." 240 In one case
in which counsel was inexperienced, had only four hours to prepare
his case, and ultimately made an unsuccessful motion for a continuance,
the First Circuit said: "[W]hen a case of this nature demands prompt
resolution, the court must consider counsel's experience and, where
experience is absent or minimal, either grant, if requested, a contin-
uance, or appoint more experienced counsel. '241 Some courts have
indicated a greater willingness to reverse for unobjected to errors at
trial when counsel was inexperienced.
24
237 See, e.g., MacKenna v. Ellis, 280 F.2d 592 (5th Cir. 1960), modified, 289 F.2d 928
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 877 (1961); Smotherman v. Beto, 276 F. Supp. 579 (N.D.
Tex. 1967); United States v. Yodock, 224 F. Supp. 877 (M.D. Pa. 1963).
238 United States v. Yodock, 224 F. Supp. 877, 879 (M.D. Pa. 1963).
239 Smotherman v. Beto, 276 F. Supp. 579, 589 (N.D. Tex. 1967). In Stinnett v.
Commonwealth, 468 S.W.2d 784 (Ky. 1971), the court indicated that the local custom
was to appoint attorneys in criminal cases from a panel made up of the newest members
of the bar. Such a practice seems tantamount to treating criminal defendants as second
class citizens.
240 MacKenna v. Ellis, 280 F.2d 592, 600 (5th Cir. 1960). But see Frand v. United
States, 301 F.2d 102 (10th Cir. 1962); Achtien v. Dowd, 117 F.2d 989 (7th Cir. 1941). In
Achtien, the court rejected the ineffective assistance claim when counsel was inexperienced,
noting that
all lawyers must have their first cases ... in said first case diligence and anxious
effort are often quite the equivalent of experience. It is also observable that
counsel with much experience often have co-pending matters of importance which
necessitate the division of time and attention, whereas the young counsel is un-
vexed and unperplexed by other matters and questions, and not bothered by
more profitable and persistent clients.
Id. at 992-93. But there is no reason to assume that lawyers who have the disadvantage
of little experience will be more diligent and vigorous in the defense of the accused, nor
are young lawyers in busy law offices and public defender offices any less pressed for
time than more experienced attorneys. The value of experience should not be minimized.
241 Rastrom v. Robbis, 440 F.2d 1251, 1256 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 863 (1971).
242 For example, in People v. Blevins, 251 IIL. 881, 96 N.E. 214 (1911), inexperienced
defense counsel failed to object to incompetent evidence. The Illinois Supreme Court
stated: "[Tihe court owed it to . . . [the defendant] to see to it that no advantage came
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The gqal of assuring that counsel has some experience at the
criminal bar can be accomplished by requiring that, as a prerequisite
to handling a felony case on his own, counsel represent a certain num-
ber of misdemeanor defendants under the supervision of an experienced
criminal lawyer, and that he be supervised by a senior criminal defense
attorney in the representation of a certain number of felony defen-
dants. Counsel should certainly have the experience of at least one
jury trial before representing a felony defendant alone. When counsel
has successfully completed the criminal defense examination and has
acquired the requisite experience, he should be entitled to hold him-
self out as a specialist in criminal law.243
Another tool the courts might use to help assure more effective
assistance is to provide defense counsel with a checklist of functions
he must perform preparatory to a trial or a guilty plea. The United
States District Court for the District of Maryland provides defense
counsel with such a checklist. 244 It emphasizes such responsibilities as
interviewing the defendant, interviewing witnesses, discussing the case
with the prosecutor, explaining elements of the crime to the de-
fendant, reading the penalty to the defendant, motioning for a bill
of particulars, motioning to inspect, taking depositions, subpoenaing
relevant witnesses, considering possible defenses such as illegal arrest,
unlawful search, and entrapment, utilizing any alibi or evidence of
mental illness, and requesting the government to produce any evi-
dence favorable to the defendant on the issues of guilt or appropriate
penalty. This type of checklist should help bring about thorough and
painstaking representation that pursues all avenues possibly helpful
to the defense.
to the State by reason of the inexperience of counsel selected by the court for him." Id.
at 393, 96 N.E. at 219. See generally People v. Winchester, 352 Ill. 237, 185 N.E. 580 (1933).
243 The American Bar Association might use the area of criminal law as a stepping
stone to the eventual official recognition of various specialty areas. The unique constitu-
tional safeguards present in the area of criminal law may mandate the total use of
specialists along the lines considered above. The literature on specialization is not very
extensive and little has been found that deals with specialization in criminal law. For
general discussions of specialization, see M. Putsm, CASES AND MANTEsAMs ON PROFESSIONArL
REsPoNsmirrr 233-39 (2d ed. 1970), quoting Special Committee on Recognition and
Regulation of Specialization in Law Practice, Report, 88 A.B.A. REP. 672 (1963), and
Special Committee on Availability of Legal Services, Report on Specialization, 92 A.B.A.
REP. 584, 586 (1967). See also Harnsberger, Publication of Specialties and Legal Ability
Ratings in Law Lists, 49 A.B.A.J. 33 (1963); Niles, Ethical Prerequisites to Certification
of Special Proficiency, 49 A.B.A.J. 83 (1963); Yegge, Time for Specialization, 3 TsAL,
Aug.-Sept. 1967, at 62.




Another means of assuring more effective representation is to in-
crease the compensation paid to appointed attorneys. It is unrealistic to
suggest, as Chief Judge Weintraub of the New Jersey Supreme Court
has asserted, that an attorney will give just as much effort to a case
whether or not he is compensated 245 and thus to imply that we can
pay a court-appointed attorney one-half the going rate without affecting
his commitment of time and energy to the defense of his case. More-
over, the compensation ought not to be computed on the basis of a
fixed amount per case. Such a system encourages the attorney to spend
minimal time on a case so that he can handle additional cases. This
piecework approach motivates the attorney to maximize the volume
of cases he handles. The attorney should be compensated either per
hour that he devotes to the case, with maxima that recognize that
some cases involve 100 or 200 hours or more at the trial level, or at
the least he should be compensated per day in court with no limitations
on the maximum he can receive.
Finally, as to attorneys in public defender offices, there should
be a self-imposed limit on the volume of cases they deal with each year.
The National Legal Aid and Defender Association has suggested that
experienced attorneys handle no more than 150 felony cases per year,
rather than, as Chief Judge Bazelon has indicated with disapproval,
the case load of over 500 felony cases per attorney with which some
public defender offices in major cities are burdened.2 46
CONCLUSION
Judicial recognition of the standards formulated above for the
resolution of ineffective assistance claims, and the courts' assumption
of a more protective role in trial and pretrial supervision should help
to assure adequate legal representation for criminal defendants. More
important, perhaps, is the implementation of a system designed to
guarantee experienced, competent, and well-paid counsel for all de-
fendants. The development of such an integrated plan will assure the
accused that ineptitude or lack of diligence of his attorney will not
deprive him of a fair trial. Rather, he will have the full benefit of the
adversary process to which he is entitled-vigorous, skillful, knowledg-
able, and experienced representation.
245 State v. Rush, 46 N.J. 399, 217 A.2d 441 (1966).
246 Address by Chief Judge David Bazelon, Robert S. Marx Lecture, Dec. 6-7, 1972,
College of Law, University of Cincinnati, at 6, 8.
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